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Abstract 
The study of CzechInvest, the leading and most prestigious investment and 
business development agency in the Czech Republic, seeks to describe and 
analyze the principles underlying the promotion of investment, restructuring 
and innovation in a country that has undergone a fundamental transformation 
of its economic, social and political operations in the last 18 years. The country 
is and interesting example for countries facing the challenges of growing 
openness to globalized markets and the need to restructure their international 
exchange patterns and institutional arrangements. The report shows how 
restructuring policies were channeled through the investment promotion 
agency with a flexible adjusting and “trial & error” approach to design policy 
instruments and to changes in the real world, while facing the dangers of 
corruption, bureaucracy and political capture. 
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I. Introduction1 
This study of the CzechInvest promotion agency is a part of a broader 
research project analyzing the principles, objectives and instruments of 
Czech economic restructuring. It seeks to describe and analyze the principles 
underlying the promotion of investment, entrepreneurship, restructuring and 
innovation in a country that has undergone a fundamental transformation of 
its economic, social and political operations in the last 18 years. We will 
concentrate on points of general importance that can be used for comparison 
with policies in other countries —especially those countries facing the 
challenges of growing openness to globalized markets, the need to 
restructure their pattern of international exchanges and the pressure to 
reform their institutional arrangements.  
CzechInvest is the leading and the most prestigious investment and 
business development agency in the Czech Republic. It operates under the 
aegis of the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT). It was set up in 
1990 as part of the sweeping political, social and economic changes that 
began with the Velvet Revolution in November 1989. Another catalyst in 
the reorientation of policies was the division of Czechoslovakia, which 
burdened the country with additional restructuring costs. The most 
important calling for Czech and international society, however, began in 
1997 when the government assigned CzechInvest a new path-breaking 
mission: to open Czech society to the globalized world by promoting 
foreign direct investment (FDI). In the original design of the transition 
plan, the motor of change was intended to be internal, exemplified by the  
                                                        
1
 The author is Vladimir Benacek, from Charles University, Institute of Economic Studies, and Academy of Sciences, 
Prague, available for contact at the email address. benacekv@fsv.cuni.cz. 
The assistance of Tomáš Havlíček and Vojtěch Mravec is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks is also due to Tomas Hruda, 
Jan A. Havelka and Katerina Mikovcova for their valuable comments and their provision of extensive information on 
some parts of this study. The author is solely responsible for errors and omissions. 
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voucher privatization scheme and generous loans from state-operated banks. From the outset the idea 
was to attract foreign human capital along with inflows of financial capital. The stress was laid on 
greenfield projects, not foreign acquisitions. The program allowed for spillovers of foreign capital and 
knowledge into the indigenous sectors, so that the rising quality of production and management would 
remain the drivers of growth for the whole economy. The government was aware that it had committed 
itself to a costly venture: any FDI inflow should be paid for by high dividends. 
The Czech Republic, with its adverse results from mass privatization, poor protection of property 
rights, collapsing banking sector and dysfunctional legal system, was considered a risky economy. Thus 
it was obvious that foreign investors would come to the Czech Republic only if the dividends were 
higher than the standard 10–12 percent annual returns earned from FDI in stabilized economies. In order 
to lower the risk premium, the government was willing to offer conditions for FDI entry that would 
signal a strong government commitment to support foreign ventures and mitigate the risks.2 It was not 
only a matter of substantial subsidies that should be proportional to the expected value of spillovers 
internalized by the domestic sector; the program was to signal a clear alliance between the government 
and foreign investors by offering them cooperation in a highly investment-friendly environment.3 
Very soon, CzechInvest launched the most ambitious promotional scheme among all the post-
communist countries in Europe. Its principles revealed its inspiration in the Irish and Scottish 
experiences, as well as the principles outlined by MIGA/FIAS of the World Bank (Morisset, 2003). 
Significant innovations were made to the scheme in 2000, and in 2004 it was substantially re-directed to 
broader targets. After CzechInvest’s breakthrough in 1997, FDI policies in most of the region’s 
transition countries (such as Hungary, Slovakia and Poland) had to be revamped. Opening the post-
communist economies to the competition of world financial capital and world markets became their most 
important policy. Thereafter it was clear throughout the world that the prosperity of post-communist 
economies in Europe and Asia are bound to derive from their liberal policies of opening-up in areas 
where the government had an important coordinating role. 
FIGURE 1 
CZECH REPUBLIC: FDI INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS, 1993–2006 
 
Source: Czech Balance of Payments, 2007 
                                                        
2
 It was a pleasant surprise when, after 2000, the dividends and interests paid by FDI firms did not surpass 12 percent of the 
value of FDI stock. Of course, we should also calculate the hidden net transfer payments due to the MNC practices of 
optimizing corporate tax payments. Nevertheless, until 2007 the Czech “dividend burden” in the balance of payments was 
still quite low because about half of the dividends are re-invested in the Czech Republic, as shown in Figure 1. 
3
 This aspect of the scheme became a bone of contention for some NGOs, which saw this step as an attempt to create a 
subservient “comprador service sector” that discriminated between foreign and local investors (Drahokoupil, 2007; 
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Of particular interest in looking at CzechInvest is its flexibility in policy adjustments. Its policy 
targets evolved quite dramatically over time, reflecting the changing nature of the reforms. Starting as 
simply a freelance investment mediator with no effective powers, it became a large institution with a 
staff of 320 and the following attributes: 
• Structured degrees of freedom at various levels of national decision-making;  
• powers to implement interministerial coordination; 
• authorization for strategic and operational servicing of both foreign and local investors; 
• targeting European structural and cohesion funds; 
• CzechInvest’s internal management comprises three skills:  
• learning from the successes and failures of policies abroad;  
• domestic (local) perception of international challenges;  
• reliance on domestic human resources by offering new opportunities to the young. 
The next two sections briefly describe the characteristics of FDI and then address CzechInvest’s 
policies as they evolved over time, since each period required different responses. The study also 
describes how the agency functions, comments on its most important programs, and assesses how 
successful they were at meeting certain goals.  
Our aim is not to decide whether it is good or bad for a country to attract foreign investment. That 
is a matter of making specific commercial calculations about each venture in each country. Rather, we 
concentrate on more practical goals —particularly, on describing the specific institutional backdrop of 
one country that experienced extraordinary advances in the quantity and quality of exports. Though it is 
tempting to ascribe causal relationships to such effects, we should keep in mind that CzechInvest’s 
policies were only a small part of more dramatic changes. Many of them were even spontaneous, and the 
government had to adapt to them. This is one of the crucial lessons: there is often a need for light, but 
the government should not shine all night and day. Very often it is enough that it does not cast a shadow.  
There is a trinity of economic agents (enterprises, governments and citizens), the trinity of their 
organization (through markets, hierarchies and informal networks), and the trinity of objectives (wealth, 
welfare and contentment). The keys to success in restructuring and development also lie in bringing 
these trinities into productive co-action. We can speak about cooperation or even an alliance among 
them, through efforts to bring about their balanced co-existence abound in conflicts that have to be 
resolved. The resulting externalities of convergence to socioeconomic harmony, patience and trust have 
various effects, including economic growth and mutual innovative exchanges. Our aim is to inspire 
thinking about how to work with foreign investors and how to obtain externalities from their presence 
once a country decides to do so.  
Now, 10 years later, we should look back and assess whether the stated goals were met. The 
criteria might be as follows: 
• Did incoming FDI bring with it additional externalities in the form of higher economic growth, 
inflows of human capital and spillovers into local sectors? 
• Were the Czech counterparts in the partnership able to absorb the externalities offered by 
massive FDI inflows? 
• Were the Czech servicing organizations partners of equal standing with foreign capital or were 
they simply subservient “compradors” happy in their ignorance and ripe for corruption? 
• Did the scheme allow Czech entrepreneurs to prosper or were they crowded out from 
dominance in the Czech economy? 
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The fundamental question seems to be the following: Did the scheme operated by CzechInvest 
open Czech society to a real partnership and active participation in the globalized world economy (a 
complete reversal of the communist approach to international cooperation), or was society marginalized 
and the chances for sovereign development thwarted? 
Some answers to the question are given below. It is obvious that the Czech economy had revived 
with the entry of FDI and foreign companies became the leaders in economic restructuring. The 
country’s economic environment changed dramatically after its banking sector was privatized and laws 
were enforced against breaching contracts and infringing property rights. The rise of large local 
entrepreneurs was also remarkable. Rentseeking activities began to disappear significantly from the 
sector exposed to international competition.  
Nevertheless, to date there has been no comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits at the 
national level, one that compares the direct and indirect benefits of FDI with similarly assessed national 
costs (such as the costs of incentives, dividend outflows, losses from relocation and induced bankruptcies). 
There are some partial studies that use scientific procedures and whose generally positive findings of links 
between foreign capital and national prosperity in the Czech Republic and the broader region cannot be 
denied. At the same time, there are biased studies that have made partisan efforts to prove either positive or 
negative effects of FDI. Now is the time to embark on a more fundamental analysis of what happened in a 
society that reversed its development strategies from national isolation to a fully-fledged openness to 
globalization. the Czech Republic could be a leading case study in that respect. 
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II. General characteristics of FDI 
It is essential for any country that seeks to catch up or restructure its economy 
to assess its capital endowments. Often, capital constraints curb development. 
In the Czech Republic, about a quarter of the physical capital inherited from 42 
years of communism had to be scrapped within the first two years of transition 
(1990–1991) because it was allocated to production without demand. Its 
workers had to be transferred to new capacities. Many of them were supposed 
to establish new businesses of their own, or to work in startups that were short 
of capital. Another 40 percent of all physical assets were antiquated or had to 
be reallocated to alternative uses at high costs. They had to be written off after 
about seven years and replaced by new facilities and equipment. Additionally, 
the standard wear and tear on equipment required annual investments for 
recovery at 6 percent of their real face value. The annual capital costs of 
restructuring alone (that is, without extending previous capacities) thus 
accounted for about 30 percent of GDP and would have to be spent 
continually during the first 10 years. The high growth that was expected to 
follow restructuring would have to build additional production capacities at an 
accelerating rate —that is, an additional increase in production of US$ 1 
billion would require an investment of US$ 3 billion.  
Fortunately, the Czech economy had historically high saving rates, 
which had to be retained. Hence the National Bank had to offer positive 
interest (in real terms) on deposits. As a result, households and businesses 
saved on average 29 percent of GDP until 1999. Later, this pressure was 
able to attenuate. As mentioned, however, the capital investment 
requirements for restructuring and growth amounted to about 30–36 
percent of GDP. This would not have been possible without sources of 
finance in addition to national savings. Thus a resort had to be made to 
government debt, an expansionary monetary policy and inflows of foreign  
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capital. The value of annual FDI flows increased from 2.5 percent of GDP in the period 1991–1997 to an 
average of 8 percent of GDP in 1998–2006. 
FDI’s most important externality is that it is accompanied by additional human capital, advanced 
technologies and access to world marketing networks. Without their presence the costs of FDI 
(repatriated interests, dividends and transfer payments, which are estimated in the Czech Republic to be 
in the range 14–22 percent) would be too high. Only then can policies to attract FDI be justified. This 
means that outgoing profits in excess of standard interest payments on capital acquired by alternative 
means (perhaps a loan at an interest rate of 8 percent) should be treated as premium payments for the 
externalities of FDI. Success in the acquisition of FDI can be then measured by the value of externalities 
(spillovers) per outgoing profits.  
This also means that the management of the public funds used for externality/spillovers/attraction 
via FDI has to be subject to prudent rules, accountability and a constant assessment of returns. The 
Czech solution was to entrust CzechInvest with this complex and professionally very demanding 
commercial agenda. Until 1997, however, government support for general investment financing was 
prudent: the budget was often in surplus, FDI was not promoted and policies of easy access to credits 
brought the banking sector to the verge of bankruptcy. At the same time, the quality of investment by 
locals (that is, its innovation content and high returns) was unsatisfactory.  
A. Structure of Foreign Direct Investment as a policy objective 
Using the definition of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FDI 
comprises “investments made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy 
of the investor.” Relevant to this study are the institutional arrangements (mainly the policies) that 
support the quality of domestic investments in general. For that we will have to work with definitions of 
FDI based on their targeting. We will use four categories that are well known from the FDI literature. 
First, greenfield investments are supposed to be most valuable. According to Rodrik (2004: 14): 
“it is activities that are new to the economy that need support, not those that are already established.” 
Such FDI requires a high volume of initial capital, new technologies and new marketing strategies. It 
also brings the most valuable asset: a breakthrough on the path to new comparative advantages. Success 
in this latter regard is crucial factor to the outcome of economic restructuring as a whole.  
Second, brownfield investments are in areas that were used for industrial purposes but had to be 
refurbished from scratch. It is usually assumed that this type of FDI has lower initial costs than 
greenfield investment, though the Czech experience indicates that investors often may not think so: there 
are risks associated with cleaning up pollution, property litigation and former crony networks that impact 
on public opinion. There are also additional social objectives (such as social cohesion or returning the 
unemployed to work) that induce governments to offer special schemes to such ventures, which 
otherwise would not be particularly attractive to foreign investors or conducive to economic growth. In 
the end, brownfield investment costs the government more than attracting a greenfield investor. 
Third, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are another type of FDI. Their main characteristic is that 
they comprise a transfer of property rather than an investment, and thus neither job creation nor 
technology imports are guaranteed. In the early stages of post-communist transition, when privatization 
was the dominant government policy, M&As as ownership transfers to new strategic owners4 became 
the main vehicle of economic recovery. As modern markets are subject to oligopolistic competition, 
export penetration of western markets was often tied to an M&A takeover at a price that reflected the 
threat of bankruptcy as an alternative. M&As can hardly become vehicles of breakthrough. Recalling 
                                                        
4
   In the Czech case practically all such new owners of former large state-owned enterprise (SOEs) had to be found 
abroad, as was discovered only later, when most new local entrepreneurs turned out to be rent-seekers because they 
found their power to penetrate oligopolistic markets to be highly deficient. 
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Rodrik’s observation mentioned above, turning portfolio investments into present comparative 
advantages does not deserve particular incentives, though they can bring a higher rate of export 
penetration and improve the terms of trade. They should be attractive enough by themselves. On the 
other hand, industries with clear comparative disadvantage are not worth resuscitating through special 
government schemes. 
Fourth, joint ventures with local enterprises are advantageous for both sides, especially in cases of 
outsourcing and offshoring. Foreign companies can access the local market and domestic firms can 
expand abroad. The whole local market can also profit from spillover effects. This kind of FDI 
penetration is characteristic of domestic firms that have already been partially restructured and that can 
assume the responsibility of an equal partnership. This definitely merits coordination support on the part 
of the government (though MIT or CzechInvest, for example) but it cannot become a policy of strategic 
importance. In the Czech case, after five years of booming inward processing traffic (IPT) in the textile 
and clothing industries, joint ventures became a marginal source of FDI. 
Returning to CzechInvest’s strategies, their priorities were also ranked in the descending scale 
outlined above according to their social gains, which were deliberately targeted by policies after 2000. 
CzechInvest gave fully-fledged support to less than 25 percent of all investments (measured by value).5 
Greenfield investments as a top priority were again ranked according to their potential for externalities: 
strategic FDI was supposed to be the pioneer with a marked demonstration effect, bringing funds 
accompanied by new technologies and know-how. Its potential for attracting joint second-wave 
investments, thus creating a chain (or even a cluster or agglomeration whose spinoffs would bring 
prosperity to the whole region), were also considered. 
B. Spillovers and externalities 
CzechInvest’s strategy sought to attract the positive externalities of FDI from its very inception. FDI can 
be treated as a public good: acquiring it entails substantial private costs but part of its productive benefits 
can be appropriated freely (or at a discount) by surrounding free riders as a trickle-down effect. If the 
leakage of benefits is too high, investors must be compensated for the losses. The problem is that the 
leaking spillovers can be absorbed domestically only if the gap between local and foreign technologies 
and management is not unduly wide. In fact, the Czech Republic’s gap relative to FDI competitors 
widened sharply during the 1990s; at its peak in 1998 it amounted to a productivity lag of more than 80 
percent. CzechInvest and (especially) MIT responded by introducing special programs that helped Czech 
firms to close this gap. We can distinguish between the following spillover effects. 
First are horizontal spillovers that affect the competing companies. These spillovers can proceed 
through the competition effect (Czech companies try to match the quality of the foreign company), the 
demonstration effect (Czech companies imitate the behavior and technological procedures)6 and the 
labor pooling effect (the employees or managers of a foreign company acquire skills at the foreign 
enterprise and later use them in a local company or establish a venture of their own).  
Second are vertical spillovers, occur between a foreign company and either its local supplier 
(“backward linkage”) or local customer (“forward linkage”). Supply networks and the efficiency they 
gain through economies of scale are the key drivers of globalization. Thus it is also of interest to foreign 
investors when their suppliers raise the quality of products and can supply them under just-in-time 
                                                        
5
    In the beginning, CzechInvest’s FDI support concentrated on manufacturing industries and investments above a 
certain minimal limit, which fell from US$ 50 million (valid until 1998), to US$ 25 million, US$ 10 and US$ 5 
million by the end). Investment in banking, real estates, telecommunications, sales networks, energy infrastructure 
and the portfolio of government-held equity was explicitly precluded from the incentive schemes. 
6
     This is extremely important because it uncovers the unknown “cost structure” of a product or technology that could 
now be produced without much risk of investment failure. 
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conditions. The same happens when a FDI firm supplying intermediate products helps the local customer 
to penetrate world markets.  
Enterprises’ isolation from world markets and comparative advantages under central planning 
could not be broken instantaneously. The process of transforming businesses often lasted up to 10 years. 
Thus it is very useful to have policies that supported learning how to compete and cooperate with foreign 
corporations, how to absorb their positive spillovers, and how to resist their negative externalities. After 
1990, the task of designing and implementing such policies was the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Industry. Its post-communist bureaucracy, however, was virtually incapable of such an endeavor. 
Investors were actually deterred by the ministry’s approach to business, and thus ever more of the 
effective investment services were informally taken over by the more entrepreneurial CzechInvest, which 
was originally established as a mere consultancy.  
Industrial policies have their supporters as well as their staunch adversaries. Since this study deals 
with such policies, readers should be aware why it is presumed here that these policies have their place 
in economic restructuring and development. The argument is presented in Box 1. 
 
BOX 1 
MAINSTREAM FACTORS EXPLAINING EARLY SWEDISH ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Although the history of industrial policies targeted at export promotion and competitiveness dates to the 
mercantilism of 500 years ago, it was in the planned economies that they peaked. The more recent idea about a 
strategic collaboration between the private and public sectors to dismantle the barriers to restructuring and to bring 
markets and entrepreneurship to a high level of performance brought industrial policies back to prudent deliberation. In 
the last 30 years new theoretical underpinnings for industrial policies have been developed, led by the discipline of 
economic geography, as have new trade policies based on oligopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale, 
economies external to the firms, intra-industrial specialization and product differentiation (see Krugman and Obstfeld, 
2003: 120–159). The stress placed on encouraging the initial movers to gain advantage in competition and 
entrepreneurial innovation led to strategic trade policies (Krugman and Smith, 1994; Streblov, 2002) and to the support 
of entrepreneurship as a response to market imperfections (Leibenstein, 1995).  
 Rodrik (2004) locates the role of the government in overcoming information traps and coordination externalities, where 
there is a conflict between innovative entrepreneurship (which has private costs) and the returns gained by outsiders or 
even competitors. Promoting the proliferation of such externalities (e.g., by subsidizing the original investors) is of a great 
importance for society, since the country can than develop a large cluster of industries around the boom of the initial 
mover. In such circumstances, too little and too much competition discourages innovative entrepreneurship. The economy 
stagnates as everyone adopts a waiting strategy while the world moves on. Thus the government can temporarily break 
the ensuing deadlock by appropriate policies encouraging the entry of new leaders. 
Source:  Author. 
 
 
C. Pros and cons of FDI 
Like all other transition economies, the Czech economy had to overcome a large number of obstacles to 
innovative decision-making from the first moments of the transformation. From within there were 
embedded social networks as the legacy of former communist hierarchies. From without there were the 
pressures of ideological interests that followed non-interventionist libertarian policies. As a result, 
official political power heavily opposed market interventions of any kind, suspecting that left-wing 
lobbies were behind them. On the other hand, there was the belief in self-enforcing and self-sustaining 
free markets. The assumption was that markets build their own institutions automatically, overcoming 
opposition from the “visible hands” of various pressure groups. It was the shock of the second transition 
crisis (1997–1999) arising from the neglect of property rights institutions that cleared the way for new 
policies of active cooperation between the private sector and the government. As pointed out by Olson 
(2000: 163): “To achieve rapid economic growth … a society also needs socially-contrived markets and 
(property) rights-intensive production.” This is not possible without re-inventing the roles of the 
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government. In the Czech Republic in 1997, such a sweeping idea was to cede a large part of the 
economic responsibility for restructuring to foreign investors, while the government would remain 
responsible for designing general guidelines for their operating conditions. A political battle had to be 
won in order to confer such a strategic mission on CzechInvest. 
On the basis of the Czech experience, let us consider the arguments in favor of attracting FDI and in 
opposition to it. Policies never have just one objective or one criterion. According to the Tinbergen-Mundell 
model, the number of instruments must at least be equal to the number of objectives targeted. Industrial 
policies are an additional instrument for targeting more than one objective. But the situation becomes even 
more complicated if the objectives are not complementary (that is, there are trade-offs between them). 
Mencinger (2003: 491–508) points out that with FDI there are seldom benefits without costs, and 
sometimes costs outweigh the benefits. One of the prime issues in discussions of FDI is employment, which 
does not have to be positively correlated with rising wages and output. Nor does progress on restructuring 
imply greater job security. Every statistical table on the estimated effects of FDI has a column expressing 
the number of new jobs. The problem is that a high rate job creation is not always a gain for the region. In 
the post-communist period there were pockets of high unemployment in each country, often in regions that 
prospered under central planning. For example, Czech policies to attract of FDI to brownfield sites in the 
Kladno mining and steel region succeeded in creating many new jobs. Unfortunately, however, these jobs 
were so specific that they were filled labor from Moravia (200 kilometers away) and from abroad. The 
investments did not lead to a fall in the region’s unemployment rates.  
On the other hand, the industrial park built by the municipal government in Pilsen and supported by 
CzechInvest’s policies yielded different results (see the case study in the appendix). This area is just across the 
street from the Skoda industrial estates that used to employ nearly 40,000 workers. Efforts to convert jobs in 
heavy machinery into jobs in electronics were more successful. When many employees were dismissed 
because of restructuring after the mid 1990s, workers literally crossed the street to secure a new job in 
Panasonic and in other smaller firms mushrooming around it. So even though the unemployment statistics did 
not vary over time, the supported investment helped bring about a fall in the unemployment rate.  
Some opponents of the plan for an industrial park —which was to receive US$ 15 million from 
the public budget—argued that it was too costly (in this case CzechInvest played the role of a 
coordinator that would fit perfectly with Rodrik’s new types of strategic trade policies). But the 
industrial park now employs 11,000 workers in firms that invested US$ 480 million. The courage of 
public administrators in making the first move to introduce a new electronics brand to the region led to 
the creation of an electronics agglomeration with annual growth rates over 20 percent. Both the 
Matsushita investor and the local and spin-off businesses related to electronics had to be pushed to 
discover that the Czech Republic was an optimal target for their investments.  
Another important CzechInvest experience with regard to unemployment is that not all FDI must 
necessarily create new jobs. As observed by Zemplinerova (2006), a common outcome of FDI inflow was a 
negative horizontal tradeoff against incumbents. This can even strike twice. First, as new and more efficient 
management policies were adopted, nearly all enterprises had to reduce their workforce, which was actually 
hidden unemployment. Without redundancies there could be no restructuring, and its costs and benefits 
were not symmetrical in time. First came the abrupt costs, and only later did the benefits gradually 
materialize. Thus a breakthrough in development could not be achieved without policies that backfired.7 
The second blow comes when the initial comparative advantage in factor endowments is reversed. 
In economies subjected to intensive restructuring, labor is abundant and capital is scarce. Thus wages are 
depressed and new development is based on investments in labor-intensive products and technologies. 
Unemployment is mainly frictional (structural). As development accelerates, robust investments raise the 
                                                        
7
 There is a political paradox arising from such a necessity —the most successful and appropriate policies were nearly always 
“rewarded” by ousting the reformers from the government. The opposition could then enjoy the fruits of previous policies. It could 
claim the gains for itself while new policies could be neglected. The next government had to start with a new round of reforms, the 
costs of which were bound to be ascribed to its debts. This explains the excessive volatility of politics in transition countries.  
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capital endowments and wages rally. The comparative advantage gradually reverses to capital-intensive 
industries. Labor has to relocate again but the new capacities are labor-saving. Previous frictional 
unemployment thus becomes more dangerous, chronic unemployment. An outcome is “Dutch disease,” 
as explained by the Rybczynski hypothesis. The Czech economy suffered from this in 1997–2005. 
Unfortunately, some observers erroneously ascribed the problem to investment policies that correctly 
targeted the most efficient allocation of resources. The problem, however, lies in wage stickiness and in 
the lack of complementary policies to support new job creation —for example, by insufficiently 
promoting small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
The lesson to be learned is that the employment goal, which is parallel to the efficiency goal, cannot 
be always met by investment incentive schemes alone. Modern industrial policies that are compatible with 
market mechanisms usually target the competitiveness of local producers. There would scarcely be cause to 
use it if externalities and the aforementioned spillovers did not arise. In a zero-sum game, a counter-
argument would be valid: a foreign company that settles in the country just ruins other local enterprises in 
the same business. There is no net gain and society loses from both the cost of the incentives and the 
dividends flowing abroad. Effective FDI entry thus cannot be treated as a zero-sum game. There must be 
some value added vis-à-vis the opportunity cost: higher output per worker, better quality, an improvement 
in the balance of trade, management spillovers, greater access to world markets and so on.  
A very persuasive argument used by advocates of investment policies is the fact that all countries 
in the region use them. If a given country wants to keep pace, therefore, it has to establish an incentive 
program as well, even if reluctantly. This argument recalls a prisoner’s dilemma, and it became 
especially powerful after Germany secured an exception from incentives limits from the European Union 
(EU) for its “new” territory in the East, and when Hungary launched its privatization scheme directed at 
foreign investors. It is generally false. It assumes that the costs of relocation and its yields are the same 
everywhere and the only difference is in the subsidy that cuts investment costs by approximately 15–30 
percent. In fact, the differences in the cost structure of all entrepreneurial ventures in different cultures 
and under different institutional arrangements are enormous. In addition, there are positive spillovers. 
Hence a grand debate has begun in transition countries since 1990: Are FDI incentives worthless 
because they target companies that would settle in the country anyway? Is it not better to concentrate on 
fine-tuning the institutional setup? On the other hand, the supporters of investment incentives argue that 
industrial policies are effective because they target companies that are in their final phase of deciding on 
relocations in several countries, and that are unable to estimate their real cost and benefits with certainty. 
Thus the subsidy is the only firm data their managers have at hand. The leading supporter of the former 
approach is Václav Klaus, former Finance Minister, Prime Minister and currently President. He claims 
that no company would ever admit that an incentive subsidy is of a marginal importance, once the 
government reveals the will to pay it. In fact, in the period 1990–1996 Mr. Klaus did not give any 
preferential treatment to FDI, and the country’s investment performance lagged far behind that of 
Hungary (a country of similar endowments that underwent similar economic restructuring), which 
offered special FDI incentives from the outset. In the period 1994–2000, Hungary’s average export 
growth rates were 17 percent, double that of the Czech rates. It was only in 2000 that the Czech 
Republic overtook Hungary, once the new foreign companies launched production.  
Martin Jahn, the former chief executive officer of CzechInvest, claims that Czech incentives were 
important, although they were not dominant. A quantitative study revealed that foreign companies 
considered the following factors: cost and skills level of labor, geographical location and, last but not least, 
investment incentives that acted as a catalyst (see Jahn, 2002). We can presume that for whole of the 1990s 
the institutional infrastructure in all transition countries was highly opaque and thus difficult to compare 
quantitatively. The incentive schemes were often interpreted as a government pledge to relieve the investors 
of institutional impediments and bureaucracy. Somehow this relieved them of the most pressing uncertainty 
of their investment. Some cynics therefore interpret the FDI incentives as a bribe that governments pay in 
order to compensate for institutional obstacles to investments they are unable (or unwilling) to eliminate. 
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Opinions against investment incentives often mention that projects which had preferential access 
to the Czech economy thanks to incentives profited from the moral hazard of opportunistic rent-seeking. 
Thus subsidies are biased towards footloose FDI with low sunk costs. In particular this affects simple 
assembly-line projects that enter with an incentive, manufacture their products for a couple of years, and 
then easily leave when they obtain another incentive elsewhere. FDI is then interpreted as a means of 
adverse selection rewarding poor projects.8 
As this short summary shows, opinions on whether to attract FDI vary greatly. Theoretical 
economists (in contrast to local business people and politicians) approve investment incentives and 
subsidies for projects with high externalities whose returns mature in the long run. Their stress is on 
support for activities (not industries as such) that promote entrepreneurship that is prone to strategic 
collaboration, the creation of agglomerations, clusters and non-traditional activities based on R&D, 
technological centers, SME development and university cooperation. Incentives therefore promote 
externalities, which would otherwise be in shorter supply. They are market-compatible or even market-
enhancing. By promoting market winners, they underpin comparative advantages and lower transaction 
costs. Market decision-making is therefore more transparent and the reallocation mechanism acts faster. 
This was the orientation of CzechInvest policies after 2000. Unfortunately the voices advancing 
the matters of public goods, externalities, spillovers, learning by doing and protection of innovators in 
promoting the country’s competitiveness have been overshadowed by more pragmatic issues, such as 
access to public finance for alternative (and less competitive) national claimants. 
                                                        
8
 J. M. Keynes had joked that financial investments have a particular attraction for people of basest character. Perhaps 
the Czech strategy of waiting also had a silver lining: the opportunists and arrivistes had already exhausted their 
chances in other countries of the region.  
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III. CzechInvest in changing times 
We can start with a summary of CzechInvest’s general characteristics. It is a 
public agency that supervises a large part of the industrial policies in the 
Czech Republic. It is active in FDI attraction and enterprise development, 
and provides the following services to investors: 
• Help with information on investment opportunities; 
• investment incentives and subsidies; 
• interface between investors and the Czech public administration; 
• supply chain clustering, zone development and supplier development; 
• SME development; 
• access to EU funds; and  
• R&D and quality promotion. 
CzechInvest received international acclaim for its pathbreaking 
strategies and swift adjustment to changing conditions. According to the 
OECD (2006: 63), in its recommendations on policy reforms in the 
countries of Southeast Europe: 
“The success of CzechInvest is due to several factors: 
• It acts as a one-stop-shop ...; 
• each client is assigned a Project Manager, who concentrates on 
the individual investor; 
• there is a clear-cut, standardized and formalized approach ... corresponding to different phases 
of the investment project; 
• it handles contacts fully with authorities at the national and local level; 
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• it has a proactive strategy to lobby for important changes in the business environment; 
• aftercare services ... and a forum are provided, so that foreign investors can communicate with 
the state administration and with Czech companies; 
• there is an extensive domestic and international network of offices... and regional partners.” 
Since the idea emerged of creating an investment promotion taskforce in 1990, and since 
CzechInvest was set up in 1992, the priorities of investment promotion have changed dramatically. The 
initial information service for FDI in manufacturing soon became specialized in promoting activities 
surrounding investments in automobiles, electronics and precision instruments. After 1997 the agenda 
extended first to the promotion of industrial zones/parks, aircraft industries, biotechnologies and medical 
instruments. After 2002 it shifted even more towards high technologies, technological centers, software, 
information and communications technology (ICT), human sciences, call centers, customer support and 
financial infrastructure. Under pressure from neoliberal opposition, it was plain that incentives should 
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In the period 1998–2007 (August) CzechInvest provided direct financial support to 776 projects 
investing US$ 20 billion (34 percent of all FDI to the Czech Republic in that period), which created 
153,000 new jobs (10 percent of jobs in Czech manufacturing). The cost of the public finance channeled 
via CzechInvest was US$ 5 billion (including pending tax breaks). The incentives amount of amounted 
on average to 31 percent of the total amount of foreign investment into the core capital assets. In smaller 
projects the contribution was usually 50 percent. Large projects could end up with an incentive of about 
15 percent. All of these were subject to EU ceilings on public support. 
The priority categories for CzechInvest’s selection of clients to support are as follows:9 
• Type of investment/production (top-down ranking) —to R&D, service sector with high value 
added, manufacturing, other services, assembly operations. 
• Value of the project. 
• Number of new jobs created, ranked by the degree of skills. 
• Region, ranked by unemployment rates. 
• Development potential—importance of comparative advantages, potential for demand growth, 
level of demonstration effect. 
• Technological level (ranked by the degree of the R&D requirements). 
• Linkage capacity and the potential for spillovers (backward links to local firms; forward links 
to import substitution). 
The weights of the above categories have changed over time. The quality of the investment 
project has risen in importance, while the significance of size and location has waned. 
The categories of incentives granted by CzechInvest to foreign and indigenous investors cover the 
following areas: 
• Job creation (by zones of unemployment). 
• Land purchase from municipalities (often associated with the status of industrial zones). 
• Infrastructure of all kinds. 
• Employee re-qualification. 
• Tax breaks up to the limit given by pre-defined ceilings on total public support. The tax break 
was therefore residual, not an automatic claim on all profits. 
A. Predicaments of the early period, 1989–1996  
The main difficulty of the Czech economy in the early stages of the transition was to stabilize an 
economy that had been derailed from its historical patterns by command planning. The search for its new 
orientation in the world was an unprecedented challenge. Opening up to free trade after 40 years of 
autarchy became one of the first priorities, and the discussion about opening to foreign investment was a 
substantial part of that. Unfortunately, from the outset the discussion turned to revamping the existing 
state-owned enterprises that were organized as monopolies. It was somehow disregarded that an efficient 
market economy should be built from the scratch as greenfield ventures —in SMEs by local 
entrepreneurs and in large corporations by foreign capital. Hence privatization was in the forefront 
(Benacek, 2001a). There was an obsession with privatization to Czech hands —hands with very little 
capital and little experience selling on world markets. It was believed that salvation would come from 
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 The value of incentives is only loosely associated with these categories. They were generally determined directly by 
law without the requirement of personal negotiations (see next paragraph). 
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free markets guiding entrepreneurs to optimal solutions. Sales to foreign investors would follow by 
themselves once that solution had matured as optimally wealth-enhancing.  
The dominant factor in the offshoring of the Czech Republic in the early 1990s was cheap labor. 
The average monthly wage in 1992 sank to US$ 142 (it is now approaching US$ 1,100). In the textile 
industry it was mere US$ 100, while productivity per worker in modernized firms under the IPT 
arrangement was about 70 percent of the rate Italy or Germany (Benacek and Mejstrik, 1995). This is 
why the country was initially attractive for simple projects such as assembly lines in brownfield sites or 
booming IPT outsourcing. Unfortunately, both of them were highly footloose and the level of per-
worker cash-flow that stayed in the country was extremely low.  
The idea of creating an organization that could attract foreign investors could arise when the 
strategy of economic transformation based on private property was set up.10 In 1990, three investment 
promotion organizations were founded. Their structure copied that of the Czechoslovak Federation, with 
one federal agency and two national ones. Nonetheless, before these organizations could start attracting 
strategic investors with a long-term vision, the separation of Czechoslovakia was decided in the 1992 
elections. In November 1992, even before the “velvet divorce”, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
separated their investment organizations, which in 1993 became CzechInvest and Sario, respectively. 
The separation gave more powers to the state while the earlier, spontaneous form of transformation from 
the economic grassroots was subjected to new policies applied by the government. Apart from for the 
Washington Consensus policies there were new social and industrial policies.  
CzechInvest was created as an agency under the control of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
The relationship between CzechInvest and the ministry has been crucial to Czech restructuring thus far 
because this alignment has given high-level political support to industrial reforms. CzechInvest began as 
a small organization with unclear legal powers, a meager budget and few foreign experts. Its goal was to 
attract strategic foreign investors and thus to stimulate the Czech economy by means of additional 
investments and inflows of managerial skills. In the period 1992–1997 CzechInvest had no major 
programs to offer investors. Its main strategy was akin to marketing: promoting the advantages of the 
Czech economy and inviting investors to sett up their businesses in the country. 
According to J. A. Havelka, the organization’s founding CEO, the vital element that allowed 
CzechInvest to gain more influence was that it could use funds from the EU’s ACE/Phare Program. This led to 
the CzechInvest’s expansion, for example by setting up offices in important business centers overseas. EU 
funding accounted for up to 80 percent of CzechInvest’s budget. Though it may seem marginal, such financing 
also allowed the organization to hire two foreign advisors, one from Scotland and another from Ireland—that 
is, from two countries with highly developed programs for trade and investment promotion. For this reason all 
CzechInvest activities at the beginning were directed towards the British Isles.  
Development projects associated with acquisition through privatization (that is, M&As) were exempt 
from the CzechInvest agenda. There were two reasons for this. First, these types of investments did not 
guarantee that any of CzechInvest’s objectives would be met. Neither job creation nor technological 
development were guaranteed by the M&As. Second, attracting an investor that was interested in such 
projects required complex information about the potential investing company and the company to be sold. 
CzechInvest had neither the capital nor enough employees to undertake this kind of project.11  
CzechInvest’s design stressed its entrepreneurial orientation from the very beginning (since 
enthusiasm for and trust in personal initiative were widespread at that time). The idea was to run 
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 It is very interesting to compare this with the system of property rights in Singapore or, recently, in China, where 
entrepreneurship and profit-claiming are not in conflict with public administration, public ownership and public 
innovations. 
11
 The need for an FDI promotion agency in the Czech Republic was apparent from the early days of the opening. Of all 
the transition countries, the Czech economy attracted the greatest among foreign investors. According to Howel 
(1995), to the end of 1993 there were bids for takeovers of US$ 11.7 billion. Real commitments amounted to a mere 
US$ 2 billion, while Hungary received US$ 6 billion. 
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CzechInvest as an organization that differed from the prevailing stereotypes of public institutions, which 
meant having an effective structure, businesslike management, clearly defined powers, benchmarks for 
accountability to assess success and failure, a high level of moral probity among employees and an aim 
of targeting activities rather than “preferred” sectors. Another goal was to be as independent as possible, 
ideally to become a separate state agency with its own status under the law and its own budget, though 
autonomy would not exempt it from accountability to the ministry. This separation was never approved, 
but the level of independence (albeit informal) was very high, as was the level of political support from 
cabinet ministers. Independence from political pressure is crucial when an agency wants to react flexibly 
to its changing tasks and restructure its mechanisms accordingly.  
In CzechInvest’s early years, training in economics in the country could not offer the human 
capital that the organization was looking for. Hence the staff hired were judged more on their personal 
performance rather than on their possession of diplomas. Once hired, staff were further educated in an 
in-service training program that focused on marketing rather than on economics.  
During CzechInvest’s whole existence there were always those who argued that it should not be a 
public organization but that it should work as a private entity. Or that it should be replaced by a carte 
blanche for all private businesses ready to act as investment promoters. Experience shows that there 
were reasons why this would not be a good arrangement. CzechInvest’s goal was always to attract 
companies that were in their final phase of deciding in which country to settle. Why should foreign 
companies pay for support when they did not have to do so in other countries? The second reason was 
that a private investment intermediary would face a conflict of interest whenever some government 
priority impinged on its profit from intermediation. For example, how should the agencies be paid for 
promoting investors that created large numbers of jobs, that located in regions with high unemployment, 
that targeted projects with certain levels of spillovers and demonstration effects? Such schemes could be 
designed, but some state institution would always have to oversee it. In the end it would have to be 
CzechInvest again that could mastermind these schemes, which actually happened later when incentives 
and criteria were firmly outlined. Then private agencies could compete for contracts with foreign 
investors when CzechInvest could outsource such operational activities.  
In the mid 1990s CzechInvest did not have any general scheme to support foreign investors, but 
there was a minor project called the Hosting Program. This was to invite representatives of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) to the country in order to offer them a presentation on the economic situation and 
investment procedures, and to recommend potential projects to them. This program was meant initially 
for overseas companies, particularly from the United States and Japan, which were thought to be less 
informed than European investors.  
The 1990s was a period of building credibility and of stabilization. FDI considerations hinged on 
a belief about whether the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) would or would not become 
solid parts of the European (or even the world) economic order. Most investors had doubts about it. For 
example, Howell (1995: 106) asserted that “there are only limited possibilities to improve return on 
capital employed in eastern Europe. The restructuring of companies takes an enormous time and pay-
back will never reach the ratios we obtain through UK and US investments.” Clearly, it required much 
effort to persuade investors with similar advisors that the opposite was true in the Czech Republic.  
Contrary to judgments that markets provide all information and private businesses are always able 
to recognize optimal solutions, imperfect information about local markets and enterprises was the main 
obstacle to be overcome. It was difficult to assess the performance of domestic firms since they had no 
business history. Ever changing national laws were idiosyncratic and opaque, and the uncertainties of 
investors exposed them to high risks. Lending and investing acquired the features of speculation, when 
redistributional motives took primacy over productive goals. Thus the existence of state agency with 
similarly imperfect information but with a commitment to take guarantees (which a private company or a 
bank could scarcely do at the time) was an important step forward.  
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Foreign companies were thus offered a contact institution so that they could first test the country 
through simpler projects. Most of the time it was not possible to offer incentives. The pilot trial program 
was launched in 1997. CzechInvest’s most successful project, because of its demonstration effect, was the 
Matsushita/Panasonic initiative that was set up in 1996. This Japanese project was supposed to target 
Poland, thus replacing production in Cardiff, Wales. But an offer from CzechInvest persuaded the investor 
to enter the Czech Republic. Interestingly, and notwithstanding the policy of no incentives, the breakeven 
point came when CzechInvest found a way to secure some tariff relief for Matsushita’s imports of material 
and when the Czechs promised to expedite the construction of the highway to Germany.  
B. Speeding up, 1997–1999  
The 1997–1999 period was highly successful for the development of industrial policies and CzechInvest, 
even though the economy was affected by a slump caused by unrestructured state banking on the verge 
of bankruptcy, unsettled contract enforcement laws that spurred too many firms to rent-seeking, and the 
need to abandon specialization in labor-intensive products. There was a demand for new last-resort 
policies and reliance on foreign capital became a priority. Thus CzechInvest could launch its long-
prepared strategies, including investment incentives.12 Later, these activities were accorded international 
recognition, placing CzechInvest among the world’s leading investment agencies in the world. In this 
period, incentives were widely supported by politicians and the public.13  
The Czech economy finally earned credibility among foreign investors and the country was bound 
for an investment boom. Investors realized, once they could handle simple projects in the Czech 
Republic, that there was state support for much more sophisticated ventures. Their perceived risk of 
investing declined sharply. Moreover, the Czech Republic’s comparative advantage from the start of the 
decade, which was in cheap labor, began to wane and was gradually replaced by specialization in more 
stable capital-intensive technologies supported by more educated labor. Foreign investors soon became 
the main customers of local banks, and in 1999 they accounted for more than 50 percent of national 
investments and exports. They switched strategies and included broader local outsourcing in their plans, 
which stimulated backward spillovers. CzechInvest responded with policies to support the building of 
new networks in local industrial and technological parks.14 The formation of clusters eased quality 
upgrading in their product mix and facilitated the introduction of new technologies.  
Czech FDI promotion schemes were significantly influenced by the Irish experience. According 
to Tomáš Hruda (CEO of CzechInvest in 2005–2006), CzechInvest’s employees were often sent on 
internships to all three Irish agencies that were considered the best strategic entities in the art of building 
competitiveness. But this cooperation declined when the Czechs became able to follow their own 
strategies and when the results made CzechInvest a competitor to Ireland.  
Up to 1999, FDI was not characterized by any set of “preferred industries” at which FDI would be 
targeted (Benacek, 2001b). Though large amounts were directed at services, real estate and energy, FDI 
was clustered to a large extent around the automobile industry. This pattern was in line with the observation 
                                                        
12
 These strategies are described further below in Section 3.1 on the Investment Incentives Act. 
13
 It is not without irony that a country whose rhetoric expressed the greatest loyalty to the Washington Consensus, and 
which spent seven years resisting any preferential treatment for its “external orientation”, suddenly became a champion 
of industrial policies. According to Rodrik (2004: 29) “industrial policies have run rampant during the last two decades 
—and nowhere more so than in those economies that have steadfastly adopted the agenda of orthodox reform.” 
14
 The effort to put the Czech Republic on the map for potential investors in large, high-tech ventures peaked in 1999, 
when the Philips project in electronics was under preparation. Philips decided to relocate its production of VDUs 
from Western Europe and invest €R 200 million in the Czech Republic by receiving an implicit subsidy of CZK 1.5 
billion (€ 43 million) to create 3,250 new jobs. Seven years later this project collapsed when the mother company in 
the Netherlands declared bankruptcy and the employment decreased to 900. According to the contract, half of the 
incentives had to be returned. However, this liability rose to € 28 million because of the appreciation of the koruna 
while the company fell into insolvency. Thus far the legal battle has not ended. Nevertheless, this venture was one of 
the rare cases (of the total of 800) when the Czech incentive scheme fell short of expectations. 
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of Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) that a growing underdeveloped economy expands by intensive trading and its 
pattern of specialization becomes more diversified. In the enterprises where foreign capital was invested, 
there was a bias in switching from labor- to capital-intensive industries and labor-saving technologies. Their 
capital and labor efficiencies have been significantly above the domestic average (Benacek, 2001b).  
Another salient feature of the FDI enterprises was that they were very export-intensive and, on the 
input side, they had a higher proportion of material inputs (coming mainly from imports) and thus a 
relatively lower proportion of domestic wages in final output (see Figure 2). The proportion of gross 
profits (often hidden by transfer pricing) on value added was then unusually high, much higher than in 
the EU-15. Most of the FDI commitments were directed at industries with intensive intra-industrial trade, 
whose share of exports soon rose to West European standards. They also showed high investments per 
unit of output that were at least double of that in local firms. If combined with the higher human capital 
in foreign firms, attracted by their significantly higher average wages, it was clear by 1998 that future 
Czech growth would continue to be driven by firms with foreign owners. At the same time, before 2000, 
few FDI commitments were geared to high-tech industries and greenfield investments. In the case of 
investments in high-tech industries, foreign enterprises had a tendency to concentrate on assembly 
operations from imported high-tech materials and not on local R&D and human capital. This was a clear 
message for improvements in CzechInvest policy-making at the turn of millennium.15 
 
FIGURE 3 
SHARE OF GROSS WAGES ON VALUE ADDED IN CZECH MANUFACTURING  
IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN FIRMS 
 
Source:  Author, based on official numbers. 
 
 
It was a recognized principle of CzechInvest management that the contact with private enterprises was 
exercised directly and kept free of rent-seeking (see also Rodrik, 2004). Since the private businesses were not 
coordinated in their joint action, CzechInvest agreed that they form the Association for Foreign Investments 
(AFI). Membership of AFI is offered to Czech and foreign firms provided that three existing members 
volunteer to sign an affidavit guaranteeing their quality and the member pays membership fees. The 
membership is composed mainly of enterprises with local experience that support the entry of foreign investors 
into the Czech economy (many of them are consultancies, IT and HR companies) and offer a wide range of 
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 There were other indications in the field studies that pointed to the need for new CzechInvest policies. The economy could improve 
significantly if local firms were more flexible in imitating the management patterns and technologies of firms with FDI. The 
widening gap between local and foreign firms had to be reversed. Local firms should also affect another, less encouraging feature: 
the tendency in large FDI enterprises to use local market power in controlling domestic sales and market entry. 
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professional services to foreign investors entering the Czech market. CzechInvest and AFI established a 
common project “Partnership to Support FDI.” AFI is managed by a steering committee that has nine members 
AFI has organized four thematic field studies, on investment incentives, industrial property, 
employment and human resource development, and public/private partnerships, whose aim is to lobby 
for a more efficient investment climate in the Czech Republic. It offers schemes with suggestions, case 
studies of good practices and specific solutions geared to improving the quality of legislation and 
administrative procedures. Foreign investors thus have an institution that can represent their collective 
experiences and political interests, one that is free of particular entrenched interests. 
The problem with AFI is that its members have privileged access to foreign investors. Some non-
members and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) protest that it creates unequal standing in the 
competition to service foreign investors. AFI members have even earned the nickname of “comprador 
servicing sector” (Franc and Neshyba, /2007). Perhaps the membership should be less restrictive, though 
it would downgrade the present elite structure of the association and thus make it less flexible in its 
decision-making. 
C. Innovation strategies, 2000–2003 
The period 2000–2003 marked a new horizon for CzechInvest policies. The Czech economy was 
stabilized after the second post-privatization shock (1997–1999) during which time the gap between the 
deeply restructured export-oriented enterprises and the local firms engaged in the production of non-
traded commodities widened sharply. A dual task arose: to support further the strong players through 
export promotion, and to promote the penetration of spillovers from internationally opened foreign 
enterprises into the indigenous sectors. The main vehicle was in the restructuring and privatization of the 
financial (banking) sector. Restructuring the failing capital market (stock exchange) was another spin-off 
associated with privatization that generally failed. While stock exchanges in Britain or the United States 
provide market capitalization of over 100 percent of GDP, the five most important stock exchanges in 
Eastern Europe (Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Ljubljana and Bratislava) provide much less then 25 
percent, even though some of them were established as all-embracing hubs. 
Though CzechInvest was not selected as an executive agent for these sweeping changes, its 
supportive role was no less important. The cooperation between banks, capital markets and enterprises is 
crucial in modern economies because these depend on transactions sheltered by risky contracts over long 
periods of time. Such contracts are not self-enforcing. Governance in the financial sector before 1997 
revealed that its main incentive was opportunism and predation, the spillovers of which into the 
enterprise sector were the weakest link in Czech development. As mentioned earlier, explicit and 
implicit transfers from the public to private sector could reach US$ 74 billion (valued at PPP and 
cumulated for 1991–2004). The access of privileged insiders, representing a tiny part of businesses, to 
such riches (compared to the GDP of US$ 148 billion in 1999) was definitely a poor incentive for 
prosperity in the productive sector. Defaults of such an order scarcely have a parallel in developed 
market economies during peacetime. Note the paradox that almost the total value of assets privatized 
under the non-traditional schemes (such as the voucher scheme) was counter-balanced by debts, the 
residuals of which are pending even today to be bailed out by the public finance.16 In 1999 it was clear 
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 For example, as Czech commercial banks became the main intermediaries in privatization schemes, 34 percent of 
their loan portfolios in 1998 consisted of classified credits (21 percent of GDP). In some other countries the peak 
came in 1999, when the share of bad loans in total loans was 40 percent in Slovakia and 37 percent in Romania, 
while it was only 3 percent in Hungary and Estonia and 15 percent in Poland (World Bank, 2000). The bailout of the 
Czech banking sector was the main component of the government’s subsidy program. The Ministry of Finance 
estimated its costs at` CZK 578 billion (about US$ 17–22 billion at the commercial exchange rate). Various 
subsidies and bailouts paid by the other state institutions (such as the National Property Fund, the Czech National 
Bank and so on) are excluded from these estimates of “implicit subsidies”. We can estimate that altogether the value 
of bad debts, defaults and contract breaching (i.e., including unpaid deliveries among enterprises, wages, social and 
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that the time called for new policies that could open niches of missed productive opportunities in the 
private sector. The entrepreneurial spirit that came with FDI, and which could spread to the whole 
economy, was the target of such policies.  
After helping to establish several greenfield projects with a lower technical level in the late 1990s, 
CzechInvest’s policies had to be restructured again. The aim was to attract FDI with more progressive 
technologies and higher spillover effects, so that the country could catching up. An important impulse 
for CzechInvest came in 2000 when the European Commission and the European Council decided on 
the Lisbon Strategy. The plan was to transform the European economy into “the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.” Now, seven years later, we can doubt whether this 
type of a “planning by decree” was a viable idea. especially when the European Commission is an 
institution with a weak command of instruments that are located on national levels. 
 
FIGURE 4 
FDI ANNUAL INFLOWS TO THE CZECH ECONOMY  
(US$ millions) 
 
    Source: Czech National Bank, Balance of Payments, 2007. 
 
 
The Lisbon Strategy, however, represented a guideline for CzechInvest. The goals of Lisbon 
became compatible with the new national objectives:  
• Supporting the knowledge-based economy;  
• enhancing the space for more efficient R&D;  
• speeding up the design of a new economic development strategy;  
• pushing the structural reforms for competitiveness; and 
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• investing in people.  
The most palpable improvement was the adoption of the Investment Incentives Act. Moreover, 
several new programs were launched in this period. Because of this and CzechInvest’s neutral political 
stance as an intermediary between public and private interests, the political scene supported new 
industrial policies and many high-quality foreign projects were attracted during 1999–2002 (see Figure 
4). The growth that accelerated in 2004 had its roots in these institutional changes. 
1. The Investment Incentives Act 
The most important policy of this period from CzechInvest’s viewpoint was the adoption of the 
Investment Incentives Act. There were two reasons for this. First, Czech society had been subject for too 
long to informal networks and its corporate culture suffered from a lack of formal processes. Hence the 
need to create a universal framework based on explicit rules that could be binding on both parties—all 
FDI agents as well as their domestic partners—so that every company would face the same conditions. 
Universally valid rules also eliminated attempts at discretionary (“case-by-case”) negotiations at the level 
of the central and regional governments. Their transparency relieved the state from interventions and 
offered space for private agencies to become involved, while the government retained its strategic 
political oversight in the role of principal. CzechInvest was thus empowered as its coordination and 
deliberation agent. Second, as more foreign companies were motivated by safeguards in the enforcement 
of property rights to establish a business in the Czech Republic, the government was no longer able to 
deal with every single incentive alone in an appropriate way. 
By cutting ministries’ embeddedness with the operational FDI agenda of accession and vesting 
these activities in an agency with demonstrated competence accountable to the MIT and the government 
alone, the scope for corruption was minimized while strategies could still be very flexible and the 
channel for information between private and public sector actually widened. According to Rodrik 
(2004), these conditions are crucial for sound central decision-making. 
According to J. A. Havelka, the idea of offering investment incentives had been maturing in the 
CzechInvest steering committee since 1994. In 1991–1996 the Czech Republic suffered because 
neighboring countries used such policies and CzechInvest lost many projects because it could not offer a 
matching proposal. At that time the government backed the policy of non-intervention on FDI, though 
there were policies supporting national investors17 and the voucher scheme excluded foreign investors 
from direct privatization. CzechInvest proposed that the government launch an outward-oriented 
incentive program, but without success. 
In 1997, after the government crisis, outgoing Prime Minister Klaus finally agreed to launch an 
incentive policy and ordered CzechInvest to prepare a pilot scheme. Nevertheless, the government was 
unwilling to allocate it substantial funds because support for local businesses remained its higher 
priority. The 1997–2000 period was just a trial period phase when CzechInvest was already entitled to 
select and sign contracts for incentives. On the basis of that experience, CzechInvest’s task was to design 
a multifaceted scheme that would balance foreign and national interests and would also become self-
sustainable. The interests of all parties involved —investors, sellers, potential suppliers and the approval 
and intermediation institutions— were supposed to find equilibrium among themselves while 
CzechInvest acted as a coordinator and intermediary of last resort. The tricky thing in designing such a 
legal scheme was to make it neither too generous nor too modest and discouraging. The other balance 
                                                        
17
    The policy of the “Czech way” of privatization came to fore as the second wave of the voucher scheme was close to 
completion (1995–97). The giant iron and machinery estates of Skoda Pilsen, Tatra trucks, Poldi steel and CKD 
industries—whose only assets were in their skilled labor and which evidently could not survive without being part of 
worldwide marketing networks—were offered to would-be grand national entrepreneurs who did nothing but bring them 
to bankruptcy. The objection that foreign investors did not offer a “sufficient price”, abusing their monopolistic power, is 
not valid because it was evident that the real market price of such behemoths was most probably negative. That is, a 
subsidy should have been offered in order to “sell” such companies. The question therefore was how to calibrate the 
rules of “marketing” such unavoidable subsidization schemes. The “incentive schemes” became an optimal solution. 
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concerned the bureaucracy. The losses from not reaching the “optimal” incentive by additional 
negotiating were offset by dismantling bureaucracies of “compliance costs” that otherwise burdened 
both parties. Additionally, greater transparency brought externalities that a private investor was unlikely 
to generate, such as investments in infrastructure, upgrading labor skills or better communication with 
regional governments. It was evident that this prerequisite would not be satisfied for small projects. 
Hence there was set a limit on the value of investment: originally US$ 50 million, lowered in 1998 to 
US$ 25 million and in 2000 to US$ 10 million. Since 2006 the threshold has been US$ 5 million in 
order to eliminate discrimination against SMEs, which otherwise would be unable to access incentives. 
The trial period was launched because CzechInvest believed that the Act has to be based on the 
national experience and not just copied from abroad. Although the new laws and their enforcement 
mechanisms were accompanied by much heated political discussion, the Act was approved in the 
Parliament almost unanimously. This means there was a strong national consensus about new policies—
a “detail” that was crucial to the Irish economic miracle. The Investment Incentives Act came into force 
in May 2000, setting a clear structure for procedures, claims and liabilities on all parties negotiating the 
entry of FDI.  
The Investment Incentives Act supported companies that invested in a project US$10 million or 
more with the following types of incentives:  
• Corporate tax breaks with strictly stipulated conditions and duration;  
• subsidies subject to the number of jobs created and the priority geographic areas;  
• subsidy for re-training and educating employees;  
• advantageous prices for the purchase of land.18  
The limit of US$ 10 million was questionable. Current President Klaus (2002) objected that though 
the Act was formally fair for all applicants (foreign and domestic), the limit discriminated against Czech 
investors, whose access to capital was allegedly more limited. Martin Jahn, former CzechInvest CEO and 
later the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for investment promotion and economic reform, defended the 
law by stating that in 2002 Czech companies took part in 8  percent of the investments with incentives, 
which was quite high considering that some foreign projects amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars 
(Jahn, 2002). Altogether, 18 percent of all firms receiving incentives were Czech. This shows that Czech 
firms were significantly less oriented to expansion and innovation than foreign firms. 
Having an unambiguous general law giving the same opportunities to all has advantages and 
disadvantages. The first disadvantage is a problem of fixed rules, where one “size” does not fit all. 
There will always be a project that would pass only if there is a little more flexibility in 
negotiations. Thus the law should be structured to allow for sufficient flexibility, especially if 
countries in the neighborhood have no such constraints. For example, granting corporate tax breaks 
(or a full tax holiday) when Czech law sets a cap for Czech negotiators (while a Hungarian 
competitor has no such limit), the negotiations become a game in which the Czech side is playing 
with its cards visible while the other players keep them hidden.  
According to T. Hruda, the greatest advantage of such a universal system based on clear rules was 
its transparency. Suddenly the transaction costs of negotiations fell sharply on both sides. There was no 
need to bluff and little scope for corruption. A company interested in investing in the Czech Republic 
received clear information about what support it could obtain in a certain region and on which 
conditions. There was also a certainty that no other company would obtain significantly better conditions 
and out-compete the first mover merely by opting for a lower subsidy. The prestige a country acquires 
from functioning laws, a disciplined public sector and a low level of corruption is an important incentive 
to invest and has a significant spillover effect backing entrepreneurship. 
                                                        
18
 Until EU accession, the acquisition of land and real estate by foreign entities not registered in the Czech Republic was 
strictly regulated. 
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From the adoption of the Act in 2000 to September 2007, only two projects were granted 
government exceptions (with practically negligible adjustments) because of their complicated links to other 
parts of the economy. These were the TPCA (a joint venture of Toyota, Peugeot and Citroen) and Hyundai 
projects. Some experts presume that the Investment Incentives Act was the main factor in attracting 
investments into high technology after 2000. That year was a watershed when the Czech Republic, which 
until 1991 had resembled Argentina or Mexico, started to compete on world markets for high-tech goods 
and information and communication technologies. A recent study by the Accenture think tank (Accenture, 
2007: 26) says that the Czech Republic, despite its small size, is the fourth most attractive European country 
as a destination for R&D investment. Note also the view of Nobel laureate Edward Prescott, who is a 
leading specialist on economic capital. In an interview during a study tour in Prague (Hospodarske Noviny, 
July 7, 2007: 21) he said that the Czech Republic was poised to become a key financial hub in Central 
Europe because of its leadership in e-banking and the ability to penetrate world money markets virtually.  
Another highlight of the Investment Incentives Act (a real innovation in Central and Eastern 
Europe) was the compatibility of its standards with those of the EU. The Act was discussed with the 
European Commission in its early stages and anticipated future EU criteria for the provision of public 
aid. Hence the toughest conditions were applied from the very start in 2000, and no change was needed 
for accession to the EU in 2004. All investors had a guarantee that their incentives conditions concluded 
before 2004 would not have to be revised downwards, an assurance that some other accession countries 
could not guarantee.  
2. Shift in the structure of investments 
With the implementation of the new act, new investors were attracted to the country and the quantitative 
trend that began in 1998 persisted. Now, however, it would be more relevant to talk about the quality of 
projects rather than their quantity. There was a marked shift in CzechInvest’s treatment of 
manufacturing. The shift was from investing in standard technologies for mainstream manufacturing or 
labor-intensive industries and towards capital-, property- and technology-intensive production. Thus 
there was a shift to investing in production associated with services requiring R&D inputs, university 
education or alignment with technological parks (see Figure 5). 
The most relevant information is that CzechInvest’s new strategies avoided the liability of traditional 
industrial policies that were biased towards “hand-picking winners” (which often amounted to picking 
losers) or marked by a desire to target “preferred industries,” with the risk of hurting the strong by 
supporting the weak. The new policies were based on supporting the buildup of endowments that gave 
modern technologies a natural comparative advantage. Thus the concentration was on activities and projects 
to support the processes underpinning the high-tech rather than on supporting concrete industries. 
The Czech economy became so attractive to investors that CzechInvest found itself in a position 
of choosing among proposed projects and thus preferentially supporting (above the standard services 
emanating from the Act) only projects with a high potential for spillovers. There was a to introduce other 
schemes that were not associated directly with any concrete investors. As a result of these initiatives, 
Government Resolution 573 went into effect in July 2002. It addressed the requirements to facilitate 
investment in software design, information technologies, innovation and production development, 
customer support centers, shared service centers and research and consultancy centers. The pilot project 
for this new strategy was an IBM venture in Brno. Although small Czech software firms were successful 
before 2000, they were not internationally recognized and were not targets for international takeovers. 
With the success of IBM, foreign investors’ attention to Czech ICT increased markedly.19 
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    Together with the Honeywell research center in software, information and communication technologies, and the DHL 
network coordination hub, the IBM Global Services and IBM Integrated Delivery Center became flagships of new 
CzechInvest strategies after 2004, when support for investors in the automotive sector was downgraded. Indeed, further 
investments in medium high-tech or intermediate technologies in the manufacturing sector were not considered a 
sustainable strategy, once Czech production of automobiles reached a potential capacity of 2 million cars. IBM now 
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3. The supplier development program 
It is important to analyze the impact of FDI on the Czech economy. One of the most important factors in 
this area is cooperation between foreign companies and Czech suppliers. Czech suppliers have often 
complained that investors do not bring a net benefit to the country because they simply replace existing 
local businesses. Naturally the problem was to analyze who was replaced and by whom. Was it an 
incoming firm with high potential ruining a firm with low potential or the other way round? The former 
type of competition should be encouraged. CzechInvest also contacted the World Bank and asked for 
expertise on supporting local firms, especially if they could develop into strong outsourcing suppliers 
and thereby complement the business leaders. Another problem was how to improve communication 
between local companies and MNCs. The bottleneck of Czech suppliers, as suppliers for a small market, 
was their inability to supply MNCs with a sufficient volume of components. Because of the lagging 
scale economies, initial offers were often judged as non-competitive in price. 
Incoming foreign companies retained their original input supply chain even though the 
intermediate products had to circumnavigate the world. For example, Panasonic originally bought only 5 
percent of its inputs on the Czech market. The problem was in stalled information channels and a strong 
foothold at least in the local market. To bring about progress, the Supplier Development Program was 
launched in 1999 with the support of the EU Phare Program and cofinanced by the Czech government. It 
was based on several policy instruments.  
First, the Supplier Development Program concentrated on heightening the quality of local 
producers. It was important to make them a part of a global leadership. If domestic firms could not 
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become global champions, then policies of affiliation with strong foreign partners could be an 
alternative. Surprisingly, as was discovered later, MNCs also needed to become “local” and to have 
reliable local partners. The first step was that CzechInvest provided for the evaluation methodology of 
the European Foundation for Quality Excellence. Once the benchmarking was set, the gaps between 
Czech suppliers and foreign competitors were revealed, which facilitated imitation to level the quality.  
In the pilot scheme launched in 2000, the idea was to match 45 Czech electrical and electronics 
firms (selected from 200 candidates) with 11 MNCs operating in the Czech Republic and willing to 
optimize their supply chain. After two years more than a half of the participating Czech companies had 
become suppliers of MNCs and the share of local input in the sector had risen by 21 percent, according 
to KPMG estimates (see also OECD, 2006: 65). 
The program also enabled local firms to remain in contact with potential customers among MNCs 
even after the scheme ended. The idea was to motivate both partners to cooperate and potentially bear 
the costs of innovation. This was the goal of the second policy of the Supplier Development Program. It 
aimed to ease communications between MNCs and local suppliers by means of a large internet database 
of suppliers’ offers, which MNCs could easily search for information about establishing a joint venture. 
Without the benefits of the economies of scale generated by the government’s coordination and 
financing, individual firms would be unlikely to enter into a venture in which they bear the costs while 
the benefits are uncertain. As this program developed, the database was divided into three sections 
according to different users: the General Supplier Database, the Automotive Supplier Database and the 
Aerospace Supplier Database. In 2006, two more separate databases were prepared, one in the field of IT 
and the other in the area of electronics.  
The third instrument used in this program is Financial Intermediation for Business Expansion. 
The problem is not the lack of finance but the credibility of the business plan. The risk of default is 
mitigated when CzechInvest can provide an affidavit to a lending bank or when even the MNC as a 
partner can guarantee the contract for supplies.  
To assess the performance of the Supplier Development Program we can look at the data on 
signed partnership contracts. In the period 2001–2006, partnerships worth US$ 250 million in new 
contracts were signed. Table 1 shows the spread over particular sectors. The annual gain in contracts for 
US$ 50 million might look too low compared to a US$ 7.7 billion average annual increase in the export 
sales of Czech FDI firms. But in fact it brought a large benefit compared to the very low public cost of 
running this free service. 
 
TABLE 1 
INVESTMENTS OF SECTORS SUPPORTED BY THE SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 2001–2006 
Sector Volume of contracts in US$ millions 
Plastics 80.8 
AC components 58.4 
Engineering 56.1 
Electronics 25.5 
Car Industry 21.5 
    Source: Supplier Development Database, 2007. 
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4. Industrial Zone Development Support Program 
The EU cohesion funds demonstrated that there was a close link between attracting FDI and the 
development of transport, energy, education and communication infrastructure. The costs can be reduced 
and the externalities increased if the infrastructure is concentrated in industrial zones. At the beginning, 
the number and the quality of industrial zones built on the initiative of local councils fell short of foreign 
investors’ requirements. Coordination was needed, which CzechInvest undertook to mediate in 1998. 
The objective of this program was not only to attract more FDI but also to create more jobs in 
economically less developed regions by combining foreign and domestic investors in a place that would 
be ready for the immediate entry of investors.  
The program required government finance that was originally used for building the local 
infrastructure and buying land. It could be argued that private investors could do the same or even better, 
especially when the investors are certain and the site could be sold to them. But industrial zones as a 
promotion program must be built without knowing who will come to them as investors. The risks in 
underdeveloped regions are too high for private investors to invest enough to prepare a high-quality site. 
If the investment is made with the help of local governments and coordinated at the national level, the 
risks are spread over a range of projects and the state and municipalities are motivated to reduce the 
bureaucracy for the entry of investment. 
In 2002 the program was upgraded in order to give benefits especially to projects in which an 
investor had already been found through the Investment Incentives Act. The idea was to re-direct the 
intentions of investors from locating on a virgin greenfield to taking over an already prepared site and 
purchase it at a discount. Another upgrade of this policy concerned the reconstruction of brownfield sites 
through the Industrial Zone Regeneration program. In 2003, CzechInvest started to stress the 
participation of domestic private firms in the industrial zone projects. Its policy was to coordinate the 
partnerships between public and private investors and to cover the cost gap.  
Altogether 92 industrial zones covering 2,131 hectares were supported during 1998–2005 at a 
cost of US$ 225 million. These projects attracted 357 enterprises that invested nearly US$ 6 billion and 
created 72,000 jobs. Not all zones or parks were built with CzechInvest support. Many were established 
by private developers because the initial economic success of similar projects lowered the risks of such 
ventures and incentives from the central government became unnecessary.  
5. The AfterCare program 
Many FDI projects after 1999 were reinvestments of profits from the previous presence of these foreign 
companies in the country. Repatriation of all capital outlays with an accelerated depreciation scheme, 
including an implicit interest return hedged by a risk premium of at least 15 percent, is standard procedure. 
This is in addition to standard profits from running the business. It means that FDI must be treated as an 
expensive credit to the host country, which will burden its balance of trade in the long run. For this reason it 
is a good strategy to motivate settled investors to keep their business in the country. That means the local 
long-term yields should be kept high enough to out-compete all alternative investments discounted for their 
risks. Thus it would pay to support even settled foreign investors in making their ventures highly profitable. 
The working contact between the government and the investors should not cease after the business is 
settled. Then there are new chances of implementing additional national interests in the company’s policies, 
or increasing the spillover of externalities from foreign companies into the national economy. 
In 2001, all these reasons prompted the establishment of the AfterCare department as a separate 
body in the CzechInvest organization. In 2003, the department was relocated and became a section of the 
Investment Support Division. Its aim was to look after projects that had already been established in the 
country, support them in solving their conflicts with administration and foster their expansion. The latter 
was to be done by providing companies with consulting services, supporting their contacts with schools 
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and universities, encouraging their cooperation with local public institutions, and proposing draft laws to 
improve the country’s business environment.  
The Human Resources Management Unit was set up within the AfterCare Program. One of its 
goals is to provide companies with skilled labor by stimulating local educational programs and 
cooperation between companies and schools. It should also help companies obtain work permits for 
foreign workers outside of the EU. An aim of crucial importance is to support the company’s demand for 
more workers with high skills so that all local resources are fully used.  
A study by Stejskal and Charbursky (2005) helps us assess the effectiveness of AfterCare. The 
survey covers 31 foreign companies that invested in the Czech Republic and the results are not 
particularly encouraging: only 61 percent of the companies interviewed knew that the AfterCare 
program existed and only a half of them made contact with this program. At the end, only 7 of the 31 
companies wished to be visited by an AfterCare representative. Though the number of enterprises 
involved in the survey was somewhat low, it can be assumed that not all CzechInvest programs hit the 
bull’s eye. There is an important rule in policymaking: there should be a built-in a sunset clause for cases 
when something does not pay off for some time, notwithstanding the excellence of intentions.  
6. The TPCA acquisition 
Attracting the TPCA (Toyota Peugeot Citroen Automobile) venture, one of the world’s most innovative 
and aggressive companies in the car industry, was a large project for CzechInvest. Its importance lies in the 
coordination between private and public stakeholders that would otherwise entail prohibitive transaction 
costs for the entrant. It means moving thousands of workers from their present jobs. In addition, since 2006 
an even more ambitious Hyundai project has been under construction and, close to it, KIA has just finished 
a similar complex in Slovakia. The region of the four Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary and Poland) is forming a car agglomeration that will soon produce 3 million private cars a year 
and around which there are concentrated hundreds of mushrooming suppliers of components and services 
supporting the production and the use of cars. The problem for government coordination is that such a 
concentration of one particular industry is a risk for the whole economy once the demand for cars is hit by a 
shock or if the producers decide to move eastwards in search of cheaper labor. 
The government’s industrial policies can vary a great deal. They can promote the education and re-
skilling of the unemployed so that factories are not forced out of the country because of vacancies and 
rising wages. They can liberalize the immigration of workers from abroad, such as from Ukraine. labor 
market pooling is a positive aspect of migration, as are the expected knowledge spillovers. Coordination 
should take care that the clusters benefit from the greater contestability rather than being adversely affected 
by it.20 In the end, therefore, agglomeration will give rise to the most efficient workers in this part of the 
world and their increasing wages will remain highly competitive. Another task of coordination concerns 
supply chains. Agglomeration continues to expand if its transaction costs are declining such that local 
outsourcing is profitable. The most efficient agent in keeping transaction costs low is the government. 
Another aspect of industrial policies is the move away from commodity production, especially if 
natural resources are not local comparative advantages. Instead of concentrating on car assembly, 
policies should target its spillovers into support services: to R&D, software, information and 
communication channels, schools and providers of specialized equipment. An aim is that, in the long-
run, no global player in the car industry should ignore cooperation with this Central European 
agglomeration. Moving away from it could be also risky: producers in the broader region would not be 
able to find a cluster with greater externalities for their relocation. 
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 Fears that the competition of four new car producers in the region will squeeze Skoda (the largest car producer in the 
country, with production of nearly 700,000 cars and a workforce of 27,000) out of the market or make its production 
unprofitable do not seem justified. Skoda’s profits have increased proportionally with the rise in competition (from € 
180 million in 2004 to € 600 million in 2006), and its production plans have expanded.  
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In 2002, therefore, CzechInvest established a special taskforce to attend to the TPCA agenda. At 
the time it was obvious that the construction of a new automobile cluster in Central Europe could be 
close, provided the policies do not give a cold shoulder to future winners. The TPCA project could 
follow the opportunities offered by the Investment Incentives Act. The only government exceptions 
concerned the intermediation and guarantees for the buy-out of land from more than 100 private owners 
to offer more advantages for TPCA. Additionally, there were municipal pledges on infrastructure and an 
employee program. These commitments were balanced by matching guarantees from TPCA about their 
presence in the Czech Republic.21  Hruda, the leader of this project in 2002, says that TPCA was then 
the biggest project facilitated by incentives in the Czech Republic. The TPCA team had to cooperate 
with other departments, especially the Supplier Development Program and the Industrial Zone 
Development Support Program.  
In March 2007, the TPCA endeavor celebrated its fifth anniversary in the Czech Republic. It 
produces 300,000 vehicles a year, signs US$ 1 billion in contracts with its suppliers (Czech suppliers are 
in first place), and has a turnover of US$ 2.5 billion a year. The dual entry of this prestigious producer 
(TPCA-Kolin was a twin investment with a venture by Trnava/Slovakia) gave a clear signal to other 
investors in the cars and components sector that settled in Poland, Slovakia and Romania. The € 850 
million arrival by TPCA was followed by a € 1300 investment from Hyundai. 
7. Rules applied at the end of the 1990s 
for ranking CzechInvest priorities 
1) The level of technological sophistication, which is reflected by high wages. 
2) Type of production, ranked from the top down: 
• R&D applied to one’s own production or sold to international clients, 
• exported services (e.g. consultancies, call centers or forwarding hubs),  
• manufacturing based on high technologies,  
• assembly operations. 
3) Value of the investment project and the guarantees of its long duration. 
4) The number of new jobs created, subject to sophistication. 
5) Regional aspects ranked by unemployment rates. 
6) The potential for development:  
• deepening comparative advantage, minimizing the gap behind world leaders in productivity, 
• high potential for export demand growth, 
• high demonstration effects of investments relative to both domestic learning and prestige 
building internationally. 
7) Linkage capacity: backward to indigenous firms (e.g. the mobilization of domestic supply chain).  
D. Integrated policy coordination, 2004–2006 
The 2004-2006 period of CzechInvest’s “mission” brought new challenges to the country’s 
transformation —the restructuring towards differentiated, high unit value products with a high content of 
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 Thus similar matching conditions had to be granted later to Hyundai —those, but no more. Hence both Czech 
acquisitions were settled in a cool and businesslike manner, and in conditions less costly to the national budget than 
Slovakia had to concede to KIA for its investment. 
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associated services. The continuous improvement in the competitiveness of the Czech economy would 
be promoted by widening the scope of coordination in policymaking. CzechInvest could not act 
autonomously without including SME development in its agenda. There was also the need to coordinate 
with projects financed by EU development funds and with support from the sectors of science, R&D and 
education. The latter implied a closer cooperation with the Ministry of Education. 
The original task of promoting the acquisition of FDI was also modified: strategic long-term 
decision-making should take primacy over operational help to investors. The exclusive authority to submit 
applications for investment incentives to CzechInvest was extended to the power to deal with development 
funds from both the EU and the state budget; this made CzechInvest a unique agency in its field. The 
concentration of policies in its portfolio was thus much grater than how the matter was organized in Ireland, 
where similar agendas were spread over four (though closely interconnected) agencies: Forfas, the 
Industrial Development Agency (IDA), Enterprise Ireland and Science Foundation Ireland (SFI).  
Indeed, CzechInvest’s new strategy of cross-industrial policy coordination transcended all kinds 
of administrative support that was traditionally in the hands of various ministries without any 
coordinating agency.22 The challenges of globalization, however, require that policies should be as 
flexible as are the external factors. The new organization of CzechInvest became an experiment, whose 
principles diverged from traditional Czech mechanisms of governance. Its project management 
techniques were more akin to the management of huge business corporations (such as Samsung, for 
example), with diversified activities crossing national borders. CzechInvest became an experimental 
pilot scheme of public governance for the twenty-first century. That uniqueness could not come out of 
thin air, nor could it come for free: it became a risky test of local high politics. The evolution of 
CzechInvest’s staff and budget (for its internal administration and information services alone, separate 
from incentives provided by the Ministry of Finance) can be seen from Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 
INTERNAL BUDGET OF CZECHINVEST 
( in millions of Czech koruna and Staff) 
 1993 1995 1997 1999 2000 2002 2004 2007 
Total staff 14 24 32 35 44 54 320 140a 
State funds overheads 5,2 14,9 28,2 52,2 83,8 166,1 260a n/a 
EU funds overheads 2,1 22,3 22,9 21,5 50,9 0 0 n/a 
Incentives granted 0 0 1.3 3,1 14,9 17,4 16 47b 
Source: Supplier Development Database, 2007. 
a Estimates 
b In 2006 
 
 
1. The merger of agencies: an alliance for cooperation 
As mentioned, at the beginning of 2004 CzechInvest significantly widened and deepened its scope for 
action. As a result of the decision by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, CzechInvest integrated with the 
Agency for Industrial Development (CzechIndustry) and the Agency for Business Development. The 
new entity was called CzechInvest – Investment and Business Development Agency. The reason for 
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 The problem of national policy coordination must be solved at the government level. However, as the members of the 
government are generally politicians who come and go, coordination is not permanent. Thus governments often solve 
this defect by a professional and overarching “central coordinating body”. For example, a model institution of this 
type has long been established in Britain. It is the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, which works closely with 
ministries, monitors the reforms of public services and coordinates their policies. 
CEPAL – Serie Comercio internacional No 101   Is the Czech economy a success story? The case of CzechInvest… 
37 
merging these three different agencies was simple: the ministry strongly needed to find some 
government organization capable of dealing with intermediation for European funds, and of 
implementing them in a coordinated way.23 With the staff enlarged to 320 and wide outsourcing 
capacities, it became a powerful instrument of both operational and strategic planning. Its executive and 
analytical capacities placed CzechInvest at the top of the public administration. 
The choice of CzechInvest’s involvement was on the one hand rational. There was no government 
organization in the country that had more experience of such coordination. From a pragmatic social 
viewpoint, however, it was quite a hazardous choice. In other words, there was no consensus on the 
sustainability of this merger from both CzechInvest’s internal and external points of view. Re-training 
people from one successful specialization to another, and combining people from different managerial 
environments is risky. It opens the door to internal conflicts. CzechInvest’s staff had to mature rapidly 
because there was a strong need for new capacities to cope with new and complicated seven-years 
program of European funds. CzechInvest was not originally projected to manage such an extensive 
bureaucratic agenda, and its human capital was in helping with private entrepreneurial tasks.  
On the other hand, it is no novelty to go against tradition by creating an institution to coordinate 
specific ministerial agendas and control their implementation.24 The main problem is the viability of 
political consensus across all parties and a disciplining deterrent in the hands of the Prime Minister. A 
change in government (not to mention a swing in Parliament after elections) should not pose a challenge 
to a revision of such a strategy. After all, one thing remains obvious: the transformation of CzechInvest 
into a development agency brought a significant number of new tasks, responsibilities and risks.  
The first natural step immediately after this merger was to devise strategies to stimulate and 
strengthen the absorption capacity of local companies in the field of technologies that required skills 
improvement and identification of new opportunities in global markets. This agenda emanates logically 
from the previous stages of development in the country: the transitions from labor to capital and 
technology-intensive production, and from national to foreign drivers of development. At this stage the 
circle should be closed and modern technologies should also involve local enterprises.  
The development programs that draw massively on EU funds should therefore aim at SMEs to a 
large extent. There were three departments managing the important steps concerning their implementation. 
The first was the Direct Support Department that monitored the Business Development Agency, together 
with CzechIndusty’s traditional agendas, and dealt with grants and reimbursable aid. The Financial 
Schemes Department analyzed additional support for SMEs and mediated reimbursable aid and loans for 
them. The management of CzechInvest was aware that financial aid alone could be treated as a supportive 
injection but would not be sufficient if local co-financing (public and private) did not lead the path of 
change. The Consulting Department offered important knowledge and skills to raising the number of 
entrepreneurs interested in acquiring the services of qualified and professionally certified external 
consultants. The “Financial Guide for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises” and the guidelines entitled 
“Which Way to the Money” were some of many instructions released for potential customers.  
This support was helpful in furthering the enforcement of the knowledge economy, but at the 
same time it reveals limits that cannot be overcome by central coordination of the public administration. 
The set of strategic games undertaken had thousands of players who had to be ready to settle thousands 
                                                        
23
 The system of management of European Funds for 2007–13 is guided by the National Implementation Plan, which is 
split into programs. A country can choose any number of them and establish its own form of coordination. Most 
small EU members opted for a small number of programs (1–4). The Czechs, however, opted for 24, usually divided 
by the agendas of ministries and regions. The problem of coordinating the spending of € 43 billion on hundreds of 
projects coordinated by 24 programs in hands of 24 competing politicians is indeed a management challenge. 
CzechInvest became the coordinator on one such program: “Enterprise and Innovation.”  
24
 See our comment on the British Delivery Unit. Scrutinizing it from the point of view of management theory, such an 
organization in the type of a taskforce is not unique. It is a standard in the army where there is the unit of the Chief of 
Staff in parallel with the hierarchies of Supreme Command. Similar taskforce units are established within the 
management of multinational corporations. 
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of exchanges among themselves, with CzechInvest was in the middle. There had to be instruments to 
settle arising disputes. These instruments require collective action throughout society —that is, the co-
acting of businesses, public administrators and social initiatives at the civil society level. The problem of 
social interaction is that such prerequisites of social consensus are seldom at hand immediately. It takes 
some time for all to adjust to the mechanisms. 
2. FDI support 
The design of programs and policies was the competence of the Deputy for Strategic Development. She had 
to consult and coordinate decisions with the politically higher institution of government, the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade and the Deputy Prime Minister for the Economy, to whom CzechInvest was 
accountable. Later, the Department of Strategic Planning and Development was created for this purpose. In 
contrast to the 1990s, when the strategy focused on attracting FDI (based on low labor costs and an 
attractive geographic position in Europe, plus the investment incentives), in the new decade the stance was 
more pro-active as regards endowments for growth—that is, anticipating and promoting the long-term 
determinants of growth. Thus CzechInvest focused on factors that enhance the motives for production, and 
on services characterized by modern technologies, R&D, and high wages reflecting high productivity. 
At the same time there was the need to support local startups in the SME sector. Sooner or later, 
strategic dependence on foreign capital will have to shift towards local catching up. The SME programs 
were financed (like many other restructuring programs) from the European Phare funds and were 
promoted in cooperation with the Ministry of Industry and Trade. In this case, technical assistance was 
provided by German consultants.  
An independent market analysis of risks and obstacles to investment showed that the imperfect 
functioning of the real estate market was the critical barrier to rapid progress on investments. Bargaining 
with owners of land and buildings, who took advantage of investors/time constraints, was an obstacle of 
concern that discouraged foreign investors, who considered it a cultural shock. Hence the Industrial 
Property Development Strategy was launched to remove this barrier.  
The Strategy for Brownfield Regeneration was another scheme that concentrated on the economic 
and environmental recovery of such sites. The quality of the environment, seriously damaged by 
communist neglect of this aspect of the economy, was a significant factor in the project analysis of 
foreign investors. They knew that future EU regulation could make them liable for such damages. They 
were also sensitive to their reputations as environmentally-friendly producers. The costs of investigating 
and cleaning up pollution were so uncertain that investors preferred a more expensive greenfield site. 
Brownfields might thus remain abandoned, which was socially too costly. 
EU standards were therefore incorporated into the Investment Incentives Act that was embodied 
in Czech law, even though they reduced the level of state aid permitted for small companies under the 
previous arrangements. Furthermore, CzechInvest merged the General Support for Technology Centers 
with the Business Support for Service Centers, which eased coordination with the tertiary sector. 
Investments in regions with an unemployment rate above 14  percent received a high priority because 
they accelerated restructuring after the new laws on contract enforcement, bankruptcy and the 
privatization of banks in 1997–2004 raised the unemployment rate in some regions to more than 20 
percent. Investors received financial aid to create new jobs, as well as for training and re-skilling 
employees. All investors promising to create at least 10 new jobs and investing at least US$ 400,000 
were eligible to take part in special programs. 
To better address the problems of investors in regions of special interest, 13 regional CzechInvest 
offices were established. These were ready for on-the-spot consulting with both foreign and local 
stakeholders. Their customers mainly came with questions about the programs Industry and Enterprise, 
Human Development, and the Joint Regional Program. 
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3. The OPIE and the EU funds 
The creation of a Division for the Coordination of Development Programs brought CzechInvest on track 
to be a development agency whose responsibilities transcended the traditional ministerial organization. It 
helped coordinate the industrial development programs implemented by private investors and co-
financed by national and EU programs. It became a standard routine that CzechInvest acted as a 
mediator between MIT, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry for Regional Development, the Czech 
Energy Agency, CzechTrade, the Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank and some other 
ministries.  
The Division for the Coordination of Development Programs prepared the implementation of the 
Operational Program Industry and Enterprise (OPIE). OPIE was one of the first programs launched 
under the umbrella of the European Structural Funds. Its rules and procedures had to be designed and 
made public long before the bidding process for EU funds started. The negotiations on establishing 
competitive administrative structures for the EU funds was one of the most complicated tasks 
CzechInvest had to undertake. The intertwined international and domestic levels of support, as well as 
the large number of applicants from home and abroad, placed additional demands on human resources—
an agenda that would otherwise require a taskforce of several ministries.  
In order to set up a transparent and viable national system for the Structural Funds, which evolved 
into a behemoth of bureaucracy, CzechInvest had to outsource many administrative and consultancy 
tasks. They could not be managed without the managerial techniques of large private corporations. The 
OPIE project was monitored via the ISOP Information System, designed for a direct link with Structural 
Funds Monitoring System. So the administration of applicants, the progress of investors and the control 
of payments ran on an online automated system. The system was co-financed by 25 percent from 
national public budgets and its total for 2004–2006 was €348 million (see Table 3). Additional private 
resources are not included in these statistics. 
 
TABLE 3 
FUNDING ALLOCATED TO THE OPIE FOR THE 2004-2006 PROGRAMMING PERIOD  
(In millions of Euros) 
OPIE priority EU (ERDF) 75% National budget (MIT) 25% Total 
1. Business Environment Development 130 426 070 43 475 356 173 901 426 
2. Development of Enterprise Competitiveness 119 991 986 39 997 328 159 989 314 
3. Technical assistance 10 434 086 3 478 028 13 912 114 
Total 2 260 852 142 86 950 712 347 802 854 
Source:  MIT, annual implementation report for 2005. 
 
 
To simplify the support procedures from the Joint Regional Operational Program (JROP), the 
Division for the Coordination of Development Programs agreed with the Ministry for Regional 
Development on the establishment of CzechInvest regional offices solely for the purposes of this 
program. These agencies were thus in close contact with investors and municipalities. They could 
receive better information about the obstacles to development and evaluate the financial health and 
credibility of projects on the spot. Having an intermediary between investors and municipalities that 
applied coordinated criteria to foreign entrants was a factor that stabilized their position because 
municipalities were not able to comply with them. 
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4. Investors in People (IIP) and company competitiveness 
A special part of CzechInvest policies consisted of programs aimed at the competitiveness of businesses. 
IIP is an internationally recognized human resource management program that connects different aspects 
of policies with a simple purpose: to raise the level of human resource (HR) management in 
organizations and improve efficiency. CzechInvest started to implement this standard to revise the 
competitiveness development and policies of qualification upgrading on the labor market. Within the EU 
Phare framework, a pilot program entitled “HR Development Standard – Investing in People” was 
launched in 2004. Applicants with the certified performance in HR management throughout the whole 
program received an accreditation, which empowered them to act as auditors.  
The Profession Program was launched in 2005 as a follow-up to an earlier IIP. It was under the 
administration of CzechInvest’s biggest department, the Company Competitiveness Division (CCD). It 
targeted special educational programs for business employees and was financed by the European Social 
Fund. CzechInvest set the principles of the agency’s policies for upgrading skills and knowledge as “an 
investment in the acquisition of knowledge and skills that boosts one’s own capacities. It is a private 
investment that can be commercialized.” Hence it was expected that its beneficiaries should participate 
in its costs, at least symbolically.  
It also became apparent that from the early stages of investment inflows, foreign investors had 
underestimated the educational level and skills of Czech labor. Their demand for skilled workers was 
thus low, and their employees had to take menial jobs that did not motivate them to improve their 
qualifications. Nonetheless, it is of interest to all parties —workers, employers and society— to build 
competitive endowments of human capital and to use them most efficiently. New investments should be 
therefore targeted according to the following priorities:  
• To attract foreign investors who will open demand for jobs requiring a high level of knowledge,25  
• to support the schemes for institutions that create and spread the knowledge and skills required 
by modern technologies. The supply side should advance over the widening demand side. 
Cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the Academy of Sciences and technological parks 
was part of the program. 
The CCD was also responsible for the Consultancy Program. It was mainly devoted to the 
employees of SMEs that were ready to improve their business strategies or to people establishing their 
own businesses. A network of new consultants was required. In cooperation with the Regional 
Consultancy and Information Centers (RCIC) and the Business Information Centers (BIC), a series of 
outsourced outreach programs was prepared to accelerate the training of consultants. The programs were 
offered at incentive fees. The CCD’s Domestic Marketing Department (DMD) basically managed 
information distribution and communication with potential customers. It established a toll-free 
information telephone line and ran an updated website as a coordination tool. It also organized seminars 
such as Financial Forums for SMEs or International Cluster Conferences. In order to motivate new 
applicants, the DMD published brochures such as “How to Write a Business Plan”, a quarterly magazine 
called “Industry and Enterprise” and a periodical entitles “EU Funds for You.” Support from and 
cooperation with NGOs (that is, with parallel private initiatives) entailed leveraged efficiency.  
The problem of many local businesses was their lack of know-how in modern technologies that had 
to be imported or licensed. Unfortunately, the strategy pursued by foreign firms was to attract the best-
skilled workers by offering them wages that were 15 to 40  percent higher than what local firms could 
provide. The latter than had to bear three burdens in their efforts to catch up: their own lack of experience, 
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 Foreign investors initially (during 90’s) demanded mainly simple labor for their assembly lines. The demand for skilled labor kept 
accelerating. At present the enterprises complain about the shortage of qualified labor and the need to import workers from Poland, 
Slovakia, Ukraine or Moldova. The initial problem is reversed now: the FDI incentives are tempted to support the employment of 
unskilled laborers for who the demand got on a downslide. 
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the excessively high costs of having a skilled staff, and footloose experts. They would make only very slow 
progress if the government could not help them by means of a human resource support program.  
The Competitiveness Development Program was launched by CCD to improve human resources 
and upgrade the skills of managers and entrepreneurs. It had three parts:  
• The Competitiveness Program, calibrated to help companies in heir further development, 
benchmarking and self-analysis through a 50 percent contribution to commercial consultancy fees. 
• The National Registry of Consultants Program to facilitate the selection of consultancy 
partners. The aim was to upgrade quality and facilitate access to the services of private 
consultants. Since many of them had no business history, their services were non-transparent 
and risky. The certified consultant registry was organized by industrial domains, regions and 
specializations.  
• The Czech Benchmarking Index was another tool to show the competitive status of a company 
in comparison to others in the market. This index gave enterprises a means of strengthening 
the competitiveness of their processes by catching up with leaders. This scheme gave 
institutionalized support to learning by doing and imitation, one of the most efficient ways of 
gaining competitiveness. 
5. Summary of the CzechInvest management style in 2000-2006 
• CzechInvest had to behave like a private consultancy without being paid for its services by clients. 
• The inspiration came from MNC management standards, not the standards of the government 
bureaucracies where steps on the hierarchy and age dictate the level of subordination and its 
constraints on personal initiative. 
• Independence from the MIT in strategic decision-making was only informal. Although the MIT had 
instruments to veto CzechInvest’s own decisions or even to enforce its own objectives, in reality the 
MIT-CzechInvest alliance was consensus-seeking and CzechInvest was able to uphold its views. 
• Independence in the operational aspects of policy implementation was very high and delegated 
to divisions and teams. 
• The recruited staff were very young, the average age being 28.6 years. Studies abroad were 
considered an advantage and study visits were encouraged. 
• Employee salaries were subject to standard norms for the government sector. The average pre-
tax salary of the junior executives was less than triple the Czech average wage (which was 
equivalent to US$ 850 in 2006) —that is, about US$ 1,960. The remuneration therefore could 
not compete with the salaries offered by multinationals in Prague.  
• Employment in CzechInvest was considered of high prestige and headhunters considered it a 
guarantee of executive competence. 
• The importance of ethics and behavior free of corruption were assigned paramount importance. 
• Neutrality in politics and non-alignment with any kind of lobbyism. 
• Explicit rules and codes of conduct strictly eliminating corruption were the guiding principles 
of professional performance. 
• Personal contact with investors, mobility to the investment regions and fieldwork were part of 
working routines. 
• Each project had its bottom line and workers were accountable to the heads of divisions. 
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6. Czech experiences of restructuring policies facilitating the 
transition to a more dynamic economic environment 
• Gains from access to FDI and to foreign managerial skills are greatest just when the domestic 
economy gets through the first shock of opening-up, about 5 to 7 years from the start of 
transition. When the catching-up is more advanced (for example, after 15 to 18 years of 
transition) local entrepreneurs, managers and capital can gradually take over the role of leaders 
of growth and innovation. Thus government policies should continuously adjust to a changing 
situation, which CzechInvest did. 
• The crucial conflict in managing industrial policies is that they should be embedded within 
private agents as cooperating actors, but the diminishing of distance between bureaucrats and 
business people opens up policies to corruption. Strict precautions must be taken on the part of 
the public administration to avoid the negative impacts of such a “partnership” of crony 
capitalism on the economic environment. 
• The investment and development promotion agency must work in a competitive environment. 
Although its privileges are institutionally embedded, there should be open windows of 
opportunity to private investment/development agencies. Thus, in the Czech case, Inzenyrsko-
Investicni. Ltd. could compete with CzechInvest by offering identical services so that the 
flexibility of public services could be checked by potential private alternatives.  
• Governments can be efficient in policymaking only if they have instruments and motives 
allowing them to distinguish “good” policies from “bad” ones. Hence bureaucrats must be able 
to break the barriers of information asymmetry and withstand pressure from the political 
opposition when some policies fail. The costs and benefits of doing “something” should be 
always be compared with the opportunity cost of submitting to any industrial policymaking.  
• Policymaking is an evolutionary process wherein the government (or its agent) should behave 
like an entrepreneur: it must take risks, analyze their outcomes and re-adjust its means of 
implementation. There should also be one rather unusual proviso: a successful bureaucrat 
should be proportionally rewarded, while a failing bureaucrat should bear the costs. The 
Singapore country study by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC) stresses this condition. Here the parallel between business and 
government service is not symmetrical: while the principal loses his property, the bureaucrat 
(agent) can be only fired. Thus his or her rewards should be only partial.  
E. CzechInvest’s long-term strategies. Projection for 2007–2013 
The CzechInvest Strategy Projection (CSP) was based mainly on the Czech Republic’s 2005 Economic 
Growth Strategy (EGS), which again was built on the more general guidelines set forth in the 
Sustainable Development Strategy that combined social, economic and environmental goals. Both of 
these were commissioned by the Czech government and prepared under the auspices of the Council for 
Research and Development headed by the Prime Minister. All three hierarchically combined strategies 
were the first official Czech documents concerned with this kind of planning, which were inspired by the 
recommendations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
EU’s Lisbon strategy. The EGS had three main objectives: 
• To set the economic priorities for development in 2007–2013 that serve as directives for the 
coordination of long-term national policies with assistance from EU funds.  
• To create optimal conditions for the autonomous economic activities of the clients of the state 
sector: citizens, entrepreneurs and corporations. Thus these three are defined as principals 
while the state is considered their agent. 
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• To establish institutions that guide economic agents towards efficiency. This concerns in 
particular the efficiency of public methods in areas of direct intervention. 
The CzechInvest strategy for 2007–2013 is based on two SWOT analyses devised to distinguish 
desirable ends and means from their constraints, as well as poor approaches and the parameters of 
CzechInvest policies and the entrepreneurial environment in the Czech Republic.26 The CzechInvest 
strategy is therefore not detached from the EGS but concentrates on balancing aims with existing means, 
and on ways of meeting goals on the operational side. CzechInvest could therefore deploy its policies on 
a more narrow field —that of exports, competitiveness and innovation (see Box 2).  
 
BOX 2 
LINKS BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH STRATEGY AND CZECHINVEST STRATEGY PROJECTION 
Areas directly or indirectly affecting the competitiveness of national businesses relative to competition from abroad 
were classified by five areas: 
• Institutional environment affecting business performance. 
• Sources of financing. 
• Infrastructure. 
• Human resource development —training and employment. 
• Research, development and innovation. 
Source:  Author. 
 
 
As mentioned, not all of the priorities outlined in EGS coincided directly with CzechInvest’s 
lesser objectives. The structure in the graph below (see Figure 5) shows the ranking of priorities as 
envisaged by EGS. We will see that although the subset of topics dealt with in the CzechInvest strategy 
is more narrow, it concerned the implementation of core parameters of international openness. 
In the Institutional Business Area (first column) CzechInvest was essentially looking for Effective 
and Efficient Public Administration (field 1.2) in cooperation with the MIT and the Ministry of Finance. 
It dealt with the quality of public services, the efficiency of its clerks up to such details as electronic 
communication among and with the public sector. The policies of Competitive Environment 
Improvement (field 1.4) were targeted at the lower bureaucracy and other transaction costs of businesses. 
Support for entrepreneurship and SMEs was addressed in the Effectiveness of Use of Supportive Tools 
Conforming to Market Principles (field 1.5). CzechInvest aimed to using European funds to keep 
incoming FDI compatible with the development of national businesses.  
Policies in the column of Financing and Infrastructure were not CzechInvest’s direct priority, 
though they were a part of an interface with investment policies addressing the mobility of labor and the 
exchange of goods and services (fields 2.2 and 3.2). The most important shift from CzechInvest’s past 
orientation, reflecting the shift from investment promotion to development promotion, was in the 
columns of Human Resources Development and R&D. In the former, CzechInvest was to provide 
greater support to education by linking it to businesses and the European Funds. The R&D agenda 
required an efficient linkage with foreign investment —either directly through inflows of ICT 
technologies or indirectly through their spillovers. For example, one of the highest priorities was high-
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 In order to distinguish between EGS and CSP we should see that the EGS is a more general top-down projection: 
setting the priorities of growth while not presenting failures, threats and constraints in general. Therefore we should 
conceive the SWOT analyses as an opposite down-to-top audit with an objective to check how the outlined targets 
are consistent with the existing down-to-earth situation in the economy. 
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speed internet communication for businesses, public administration and schools. In this area CzechInvest 
became a crucial implementation agent of the EGS.27  
 
FIGURE 6 
RANKING OF PRIORITIES (OBJECTIVES AND THEIR MEANS) IN THE EGS DOCUMENT 
 
Source:  Source: Economic Growth Strategy (11/2005 
 
CzechInvest’s policies shifted quite suddenly into the areas of knowledge, know-how, skills, 
education, human resources and R&D. For example, it was to cooperate in raising human resource 
quality in businesses by advisory services and through a trio of supports: boosting skills level in 
companies by matching the supply of school leavers with companies’ demand; mitigating unemployment 
in depressed areas by re-skilling and new investments; and removing the barriers to the growth of 
strategic business services and technology centers. CzechInvest was therefore to cooperate with the 
Ministry of Education in the raising of standards in universities, promotion of managerial education of 
students and portability of know-how and skills among sectors. The mobility of qualified foreign 
employees, studies abroad and managerial spillovers were another part of the strategy.  
The support of competitiveness of firms and their potential for real growth (contrasted to 
“growth” based on price hikes or rent-seeking) is directly related to the potential of innovations. As 
marked by CzechInvest’s official title “Agency for Investment and Business Development”, policies 
directed at education, innovations and R&D must become the main instruments of its activities. 
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 Economic Growth Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2004, p. 74, chapter on Increasing Availability of Broadband 
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public and private sectors 
3.3 Accelerating economic 
growth of regions 







the sectoral structure 
of comparative pricing 
advantages 
4.1 Increasing 
flexibility of the 
education system 
4.2 Increasing the 
level of education of 
older generation 
4.3 Providing sufficient 
labour force 
4.4 Increasing 




motivating to work 
4.6 Improving strategic 





development as a 
source of innovation 
5.2 Establishing 
functional cooperation 
between the public and 
private sectors in 
research, development 
and innovations 
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According to EGS, the progress in the Czech economy cannot do without primarily overarching the gap 
in the efficiency of R&D, which would then justify the secondary move in increasing its public co-
financing.28 EGS estimates that an annual increase in public expenditures on R&D by 20 percent to 25 
percent until 2010, while a similar growth should come from the matching private resources. The public 
per private R&D funding should therefore remaining at the share 1:2.  
The policies of CzechInvest could not then avoid interfering with measures for higher efficiency 
in the state administration (field 5.4). There should be implemented a new program targeting the feed-
back between public administration and the needs of private companies. To sum up, the development 
strategy of CzechInvest is to be involved in the following areas: 
• Increase in R&D expenditures as a follow-up of raised R&D efficiency; 
• intellectual property rights protection, which enhances its efficiency; 
• coordination of financial sources dedicated to R&D from both the EU and the national funds; 
• public dialogue among governments, enterprises and citizens about the ways for implementing 
innovations enhancing the growth and general welfare of citizens; 
• greater cooperation between public and private sector because it is the latter that leads the path 
to sustained development.  
As became evident from reaching the present stage of development,29 notwithstanding the fact 
that the Czech Republic is a small country crucially dependent on international exchanges, its future 
depends on mastering the internal parameters of development: the endowments of national human 
resources, R&D and healthy institutional environment promoting entrepreneurial spirits, competition, 
social cohesion and efficiency. In another words, a necessary condition for a successful international 
cooperation is a strong local-market position. The gains from a highly competitive tradable sector cannot 
be wasted in the black hole of inefficiencies of non-tradable sectors such as public administration, 
healthcare, education or R&D. The success abroad starts at the success at home. 
Figure 7 shows how CzechInvest envisaged its future orientation of policies. The core is the 
national development in innovations and technologies, which should be supported by investment and 
business development policies. The weight of the latter should increase substantially in time and 
integrate under its agendas the investment policies. 
FIGURE 7 










Source: Czechinvest strategy. 
                                                        
28
 EU’s average R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP is less then 2 percent. The EU Lisbon Agenda goal is to 
increase the amount of investments to at least 3 percent of GDP by 2010. Czech R&D expenditure of 1.6 percent is 
evidently insufficient for such a task. 
29
 Czech present economic characteristics can be describes as reaching the level of GDP per capital of Portugal, 
gradually catching-up with Spain and keeping up with the development in South Korea. 
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The expansion of services provided by CzechInvest since its inception in 
1991 that in more recent years transcended the borders of ministries, the 
ability to change strategies for complying with evolving requirements and 
the success in attracting FDI in both the quantity and quality were widely 
conditioned by the fact that CzechInvest managed to avoid discords at the 
level of high politics. At the same time the departure of Czech political 
scene from a monopoly of one totalitarian party to a system of multi-party 
coalitions was not without problems of stability. For example, the three most 
powerful parties (i.e. the conservative ODS, Social Democrats SD and 
Communists) are not able to form coalitions and the government depends on 
the alliance with another two small footloose parties (Christian Democrats 
and Greens) that brings the balance of power at the knife edge. 
So the politics of CzechInvest was to stay outside of politics – an 
attitude that worked until 2007. Nevertheless, its professional position was 
highly political: CzechInvest ruled over a crucial field of national 
industrial policies. With the access to foreign capital and the EU funds it 
became an agent of paramount political concern. Its main danger was in 
becoming a political instrument. The defense of their independence and 
professional competence was therefore in strict political neutrality and in 
an appeal for political consensus in its goals. This was accomplished 
thanks to the following: 
Firstly, after the almost FDI-shy mid 90’s two of the Czech 
strongest political parties (ODS of the right and SD of the left) agreed that 
the country needs FDI and that the FDI needs an institutional support 
across all politics. Secondly, from the beginning, CzechInvest showed  
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highly satisfying results, so no one with the competence of appointing a new CEO in order to reverse its 
strategies did so, even though political lobbies were often calling for a change. Thanks to the consensus 
in high politics CzechInvest could exercise universal innovative strategies and ensure  for it the required 
level of independence. The fact that its CEOs were not replaced after every change of the minister of 
MIT (as it was a rule in neighboring countries), was a crucial moment for the development of the 
agency. It is worth mentioning that this relatively high level of independence, the stress on professional 
competence and the political neutrality of CzechInvest went along with the agency through the whole 
period of its existence up to 2007. 
Aftermath of the most controversial polls of June 2006 that resulted in enormous problems in 
constituting a stable ruling coalition, led also to a split with the past politically neutral approach to industrial 
policies. With the reconstituted coalition of May 2007, the new Cabinet and the new libertarian minister of 
industry and trade, the politics towards CzechInvest called for a change. The CEO of CzechInvest (Mr. T. 
Hruda) was called off and, in response of a protest, more than a half of the staff of 320 resigned from the 
agency. Since the early days of CzechInvest inception until 2006 the political power and the 
entrepreneurship of FDI promotion were subject to a consensus. The sudden clash between the economic 
logic of policy-making as a service and the political logic about public administration as a control over 
privileges, brought the past equilibrium between the public-private alliance to a watershed.  
The future of both the agency and its industrial policies are now uncertain. The official argument 
of the Ministry was that CzechInvest broke several laws in the last year, that the efficiency of industrial 
policies were questionable and that there were alternatives to the style of running CzechInvest. The 
question is whether the loss of a centrally operated and entrepreneurially-driven institution of public 
administration could be substituted by piece-meal initiatives coming from the private sector. The 
paradox is that CzechInvest was not an impediment to private initiatives of investors above US$ 10 
million. It was just a service enhancing the power or markets in this segment of the economy.30 Some 
marginal enterprises of the medium-size could be hurt with this system. That would be a serious flaw if 
SMEs would be direct substitutes to the large corporate sector. Facts do not support this hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, SMEs could have been compensated by government policies and institutional relieves 
operated by MIT, Ministry of Finance or European Funds. The performance of a sub-prime racing horses 
will hardly improve if one restricts the care allowed to be given to the champions. It is true, for many the 
care given to champions seems to be unfair. But it is then somehow forgotten that the public demand is 
for winning champions and not for the wannabes. 
The particular reasons for the intervention are as important as are its consequences. The loss of 
the concentration of human resources in CzechInvest, whose unique expertise was built for long period, 
is definitely a loss. That loss occurred in an unfortunate moment: when the Czech Republic entered into 
the period of EU restructuring offensive with its 2007-13 cross-industrial programs of policies for 
competitiveness and cohesion, and when the Czech Republic should take over the EU presidency in 
2009. The importance of policies coordinating the public and the private sectors, and the intermediation 
between national and international levels of decision-making have acquired an unprecedented 
importance. It is obvious that the importance of an agency akin to CzechInvest has not yet declined. The 
opposite seems to be true: this globalized world is particularly dependent on champions. We do not need 
performing champions among private businesses only, there should be the need for performing 
champions among public administrators, too. The criterion both is the outstanding performance, not the 
production of some medal. 
If we would try to explain the roots of present uncomfortable situation and to learn from it for the 
future, we can come with the following hypotheses: The expansion of coordinated strategies of 
                                                        
30
 The logic of investment incentives is to support most probable winners because investment (in contrast to red bottom 
line or losing market share) is a proxy variable associated with expansion and successful business. Support of foreign 
investment implies a support of world-competitive business. Investment incentives are therefore a form of industrial 
policies that are most closely compatible with market forces. They are a sort of a leverage for supporting the winners 
already pre-picked by markets.  
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development into fields, which were traditionally the domains of certain ministries and political parties (i.e. 
the amalgamation of strategies of CzechInvest after 2003 driven by the entry of the economy into the club 
of advanced countries) is always a social experiment that is open to backfire. It has a chance for success 
only if there is a wide political consensus or/and if the country is on a verge of a shattering crisis.  
The reality in 2007 was just the other way round: Czech politics were in a crisis and the economy was at 
its best. Every revolutionary idea of reorganizing the existing social order with the aim at gaining on economic 
efficiency is always socially and politically very risky. It opens the door to uncertainty and to the abuse of 
changes. The idea of integrating CzechInvest with the so far independent agencies of CzechIndustry, 
CzechTrade and SME Development, plus with some agendas of European Funds and policies of education and 
R&D, was a path-breaking social innovation. Therefore, even though it looked technically logical and backed 
by the evolution of economic environment, it became a painful political issue. Too many political structures 
would have to be modified and some of them would definitely lose on influence. Notwithstanding the outcome 
that the society would gain as a whole, some social groups would be open to the risks of reallocation and the 
ensuing costs of transition – so they would support the status quo.  
As an alternative, there could have been implemented the standard second-best solution of a 
crawling evolution: that of incremental changes within the existing system. There was a counter-
proposal of establishing an association, in which three agencies would keep their legal independence, 
but their cooperation would be much closer, so that they would not overlap and would not pass hot 
potatoes to each other.31 This project was supposed to merge certain departments of the agencies, which 
could be run jointly by creating a small headquarter for coordinating the alliance. The three CEOs of the 
agencies would take turns in the leadership of the association, rotating every year. The project suddenly 
stalled when in the last phase of the conversion the CzechTrade withdrew their support and the 
Government opted for a more radical solution.  
J. A. Havelka (the founding CEO of CzechInvest) agrees that the main problem, which escalated 
into the calling off T. Hruda, was the absolute merger that occurred in 2004. With more responsibilities 
in the agenda of CzechInvest, more money were involved. The most enticing was the financial means 
coming to CzechInvest from the European Funds for the coordination of national “Enterprise and 
Innovation” project. That became a politically risky position for CzechInvest that kept a neutral 
relationship to politics. The major mistake was that amalgamated CzechInvest was not subordinated 
directly to the Prime Minister or at least to his first deputy. 
An alternative to big plans are the small plans. Keeping CzechInvest at low profile as an 
investment servicing agency would imply little risks in external intervention. The antagonism between 
socially optimal first best and the second best of local stability is a case of prisoner’s dilemma. It is 
notoriously biased to socially suboptimal choices. So, CzechInvest and the Czech society received its 
dues. The only good in it is that the others can learn later from their flaws.  
Throughout the existence of CzechInvest, the agency strived for acquiring the position that would 
not be exposed to political shake-ups. Its goal was to get autonomy from the MIT or, optimally, to get its 
position upgraded to an agency accountable to the deputy PM, becoming so a vehicle of inter-ministerial 
coordination. Such efforts increased in importance when the scope of CzechInvest policies had to target 
areas beyond manufacturing, industries and trade – such as the R&D and innovation, collaboration with 
universities and the harmonization of domestic policies with the EU objectives. Therefore the 
cooperation under the umbrella of MIT had no better option but to deal closely with the policies of the 
Ministry of Education, Ministry of Regional Development, Ministry of Transportation and the Academy 
of Sciences. Obviously, it was of little help to the power games of the MIT to let its strategic agency 
moved up in the hierarchy of influence. Thus stripping it off the power was more accommodating.  
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 Every country is challenged by this kind of strategic choice. For example, Ireland has not amalgamated its four institutions of 
economic promotion: Forfas, IDA, Enterprise Ireland and SFI. In addition, there remained three autonomous advisory 
councils: NCC, EGFSN and ACSTI. The problem is how to keep the decision-making both effective and politically stable by 
the degree of interlinking key stakeholders of industrial policies. The Irish solution seems to be more robust to shocks. 
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The shakeup of the 2007 illustrates how modern industrial policies are easily hurt by political 
weaknesses, even in cases of wavering that could be only temporary. It takes long time to build a 
functioning institution of restructuring policies that supervises both the strategies and the operational 
agenda. It is known from the experience of failing planned economies and of successful countries in the 
Far East that industrial (i.e. restructuring) policies can be neither designed not executed by bureaucrats 
alone. Industrial policies have to be embedded within the operations of markets and, therefore, in an 
environment of coordination between the public and the private sectors. Otherwise the information and 
the coordination failures among businesses cannot be eliminated by isolated government intervention. 32 
It is not easy to come at this moment with an assessment of CzechInvest policies because there 
were many of them, acting often in mutual interdependence and they had its tides and ebbs changing 
over the time quite rapidly. At least, this confirms the presence of two important principles of industrial 
policies from the list of Rodrik, 2004, that we enlist below in the appendix 4.3: the existence of built-in 
sunset clauses and the capacity to renew (reinvent) its own activities. Indeed, CzechInvest reacted very 
flexibly to the rapidly evolving landscape of the Czech economy without defecting to ad hoc policies. 
CzechInvest has shown a clear drive to move away form the traditional Czech informal policy-making 
and the reliance on the network of clients –most probably the weakest links in the Czech social 
governance. In that respect it became the leading Czech institution of public administration. In addition, 
it was one of its rare institutions that had to fight for its position in an open international competition.  
The rapidly changing landscape of CzechInvest’s policies does not offer much information for the 
analysis of its individual cases. Analytical data should have continuity and permanence. In evaluating the 
performance of CzechInvest we can start by stating that the agency attracted US$13412 million of FDI 
during 1993–2005. At the same time the Czech Republic attracted US$ 47859 million in the same 
period, which means that more than a quarter of FDI inflows to the country were dealt with by 
CzechInvest. Private businesses had therefore sufficient space for acting on their own if the services 
provided would not be satisfactory. CzechInvest’s bureaucracy and compliance costs were actually very 
low, thanks to its transparent rules. At the same time we know that incentive policies of CzechInvest 
were designed in a way that allowed for spillovers of positive externalities to all investors, even to those 
who did not take part in official schemes. CzechInvest thus acted as an instrument of leverage of policies 
throughout the economy. 
Table 3 compares the FDI in the Czech Republic with other successful transforming countries in 
Central Europe. The progress in each of them would be very different if the countries would not have 
liberal investment policies and if their promotion agencies would not be present.  
 
TABLE 4 
FDI INFLOWS TO CENTRAL EUROPE, AMOUNT OF FDI INVESTED IN THE COUNTRY 
(In millions of dollars) 
 
1990-2000 
Annual average 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
FDI capital 
in dollars 
Czech Republic 2 131 8 483 2 101 4 974 10 991 47 859 4 679 
Poland 3 699 4 131 4 589 12 873 7 724 66 307 1 721 
Slovakia 422 4 094 756 1 261 1 908 12 239 2 248 
Hungary 3 244 2 994 2 137 4 654 6 699 48 924 4 913 
Source:  ec.europa.eu/eurostat. 
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 The literature on this topic includes Evans P.: Embedded Economy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, 
 Princeton Univ. Press, 1995; Hausmann R., Rodrik D.: Economic Development as Self-Discovery, J. of Development 
 Ecs, 72, 2003; Lall S.: Reinventing Industrial Strategy: The Role of Government Policy in Building Industrial 
 Competitiveness, G-24, Discussion Paper no. 28, 2004; or Rodrik D.: Coordination Failures and Government Policy: 
 A Model with Applications to East Asia and Eastern Europe. J. of International Ecs, 40, 1996: 1-22. 
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In 2005 Hungary and the Czech Republic reached the levels of FDI stocks that Portugal and Spain 
accumulated in 2002 since their openness to the world in late 70’s.33 As was already discussed above, the 
quantity of FDI is not the same as the quality of FDI. In the latter we should assess the whole process of 
attracting FDI and the spillovers FDI brought to the country. An objective economic evaluation of FDI 
attraction to the country as a whole is not easy. It is quite complicated to assess the social spillovers of FDI. 
It is even more complicated to quantify the opportunity costs of FDI –i.e. the potential development of the 
economy if domestic firms would not be challenged by foreign competitors and if many of them would not 
have to fight for survival. Last but not least, FDI is not coming to the economy for free. FDI is an 
investment akin to venture capital: it may help a lot to the national economy but its success is checked by 
the necessary profit sharing. Therefore dividends and interests from FDI and (rather less known) repatriated 
transfer prices, are the costs of having it in the country. The Czech FDI stock of US$ 53 billion in 2006 
generated US$ 32 billion in aggregated official dividends, i.e. 61 percent. Fortunately more than a half were 
reinvested dividends, so that the net outflow represented mere 26 percent of the principal invested. 
However, the repatriated dividends have a sharply rising trend and the Czech Republic should be prepared 
for annual disbursements of US$ 5 billion –i.e. more than all expected FDI annual inflows.  
Until 2001 there were not many studies that would come with the conclusion that FDI into the 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe led to a significant degree of productivity spillovers into the 
domestic sector by means of technological transfers. Görg and Greenaway, 2002, quoted that none out of 
five studies of FDI in Europe prior to 2001 brought conclusive evidence about positive spillovers and 
actually four of them discovered the existence of negative spillovers at the enterprise level. Mencinger , 
2003, was even more negative and suggests that the optimism about FDI externalities is a fiction because 
the negative trade-offs prevail. The first ones who came with positive news were studies by Campos and 
Kinoshita, 2002 and 2003, who discovered a positive robust link between FDI and industrial growth of 
the indigenous sector in eastern Europe. Surprisingly, the Czech Republic was a country showing the 
largest spillovers. Later Javorcik, 2004, found FDI productivity spillovers in their backward supply 
chains but little horizontal spillovers. More recently, a study by Ayyagari and Kosova, 2006, found a 
significant presence of horizontal and vertical spillovers of FDI in Czech industrial data for 1994-2000. 
Unfortunately it was the services only that were the clear beneficiaries of the FDI. 
Notwithstanding the little evidence about spillovers (both positive and negative), there are 
prevailing conclusions in the studies of FDI in the CEECs that the advances in productivities occur 
inside of the incoming foreign enterprises. It is also the foreign firms that benefit most from the 
externalities of clusters. The business studies also reveal that domestic managers improved significantly 
by learning from the managerial techniques of foreign firms. There are therefore other and less disputed 
externalities that FDI brought with itself: those of the improvements in the local institutional 
environment and in the culture of entrepreneurship in general.  
The final assessment of FDI promotion costs can be reduced to the following considerations:  
• Is the trade balance posing a threat in its sustainability due to FDI related exports and imports?  
• Is the balance of payments in disequilibrium because of the FDI related deficit in financial 
inflows and outflows?  
• Is the economy with an intensive absorption of FDI having high or low rates of growth?  
• Are the real wages rising?  
• Is the foreign influence on domestic economy, social welfare and culture sustainable?  
• Do the citizens feel well in a country intensively opened to the globalized world? 
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 That means US$ 4360 for Portugal and US$ 5290 for Spain in 2002 (statistics of UNCTAD, 2004). 
CEPAL – Serie Comercio internacional No 101   Is the Czech economy a success story? The case of CzechInvest… 
52 
The list of CzechInvest’s achievements should not miss the following:  
• The adoption of the Investment Incentives Act in a form of guidelines for a transparent 
strategic decision-making of all investors. 
• Political neutrality that was upheld for 14 years, which was quite exceptional both in the 
Czech Republic and among the transition countries. 
• Sticking to the principle that agencies of public administration must be in close contacts with 
the private sector and at the same time avoid being captured into cronyism and corruption. 
• Effective management that was able to rely on techniques practiced by private corporate 
sector. 
• Targeting its policies at the support of activities promoting competitiveness in technologies 
and not at attempts for picking the winning sectors.  
As an attempt at evaluating the policies of CzechInvest according to criteria outlined by Rodrik 
/2004/ we cannot but accept that all of the Rodrik’s principles could be found in the form or in the 
contents of CzechInvest policy design and implementation. Also the six examples of programs 
mentioned by Rodrik (p. 26-29) have their respective representatives in the Czech policies, even though 
not all of them were coordinated solely by CzechInvest. 
The experience of former CEOs of CzechInvest (J. A. Havelka and T. Hruda) and 
recommendations for other countries that consider establishing or developing an agency similar to 
CzechInvest can be summed up as follows.  
• There is a crucial importance of the political consensus at the national level that must 
safeguard the agency throughout the whole time of its existence. Once the agency becomes a 
target of political fights, its efficient performance can no longer be upheld.  
• Paramount ethical demands laid down upon the staff. The CEO of such an agency must be an 
experienced and widely respected person without any taints in his/her professional carrier and 
with high negotiating skills. Since persons with such qualities are extremely rare, it could be a 
foreign expert of acclaimed prestige and with experience in working in a similar agency. Then 
his/her leadership becomes a matter of national prestige that is not disputed. 
• Human resources recruiting young employees. In case the managerial style diverges from the 
traditional routines of public service, the hiring of very young staff (the average age was 28.6 
years), even to the managerial positions, is not a liability but an asset.  
• Personal contact with investors and with field-work, complemented with personal 
accountability and safeguards against corruption. 
• Targeting of the demonstration effects that act as a leverage. They cannot be limited on 
domestic externalities of efficiency only. There are also foreign externalities building the 
image of the country abroad. Like in any marketing, the prices of commodities rise when the 
demand finds them more appealing and when the trust in their long-term qualities prevails. 
Such externalities embrace all what the country does.  
• Short-term gains must have lower priority than externalities and spillovers of long-term 
efficiency. Without them the FDI promotion misses its main mission. 
• The style of entrepreneurial management. The management of national agencies of strategic 
decision-making should be commensurate to the fact that while development and restructuring 
institutions are a body of the public sector, their spirit and efficiency must be that of the 
private sector. Adopting the managerial techniques of the corporate sector are its salient 
feature. It is the transparency and the general access to incentives that distinguish the 
CEPAL – Serie Comercio internacional No 101   Is the Czech economy a success story? The case of CzechInvest… 
53 
performance-oriented policies from the redistributional rent-seeking policies. The risks of 
cronyism and corruption is present in all politics and policies.  




CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE RESTRUCTURING POLICIES CHANNELED THROUGH 
INVESTMENT PROMOTION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
Czech policies of stabilization, restructuring and development were heterogeneous and they were flexibly adjusting 
to the changing reality in the world. 
Approach by “trial & error” in designing the policy instruments could not be avoided. However, their usage was 
subject to political checks & balances, risk assessment and the screening of effects. The underperformance of some 
policy was a reason for its re-design or for closing down.  
The main dangers of policies associated with incentives were: corruption, bureaucracy and political rivalry. The 
system of management was able to control them and minimize their occurrence. 
The main drivers of progress in the FDI efficiency were seen in the promotion of entrepreneurship of incoming FDI 
(strongly supported policies) and the spillovers to indigenous SMEs (supported mainly by MIT, often in cooperation with 
CzechInvest, CzechIndustry and financial institutions). 
The alliance on the side of public policies was formed by the cooperation between the following main bodies: 
CzechInvest – in the leadership in policy-making (especially in investment strategies); 
Ministry of Industry and Trade – in providing political support to CzechInvest and in its own programs supporting the 
SME, international trade (via CzechTrade) and innovation promotion;  
Ministry of Finance – in providing the national funding (though lacking a strong strategic vision); Ministry of 
Education – in coordinating the national strategy of education, R&D development and a part of innovation policies 
(though being rather financially weak);  
Ministry of Justice – in adjusting the procedures for property rights enforcement (though lagging by approximately 5 
years behind requirements); 
Ministry of Regional Development – in coordinating the EU structural funds with national regional policies. 
Source:  Author. 
 
 
Improved economic policies, coordination between the institutions mentioned above and impacts 
of incoming FDI on the whole economy brought the economic growth above 6 percent for 2005-2007 
and the prediction expects that high growth will be sustainable in longer period. Notwithstanding the 
success of policies, politics at both the central, regional and municipal levels are generally recognized as 
the weakest links in the national development. Some estimates claim that the impact of present weak 
politics on the growth is a decrease by 2 percent, relative to the growth potential. That implies at the 
same time that the natural growth generated by the private sector is robust enough to withstand ups and 
downs in local politics.  
Compared to the catastrophic situation in the country in 1991, the Czech economy in 2007 has 
changed fundamentally and is able to compete on the world markets for constantly rising market share 
not only in its traditional domain (mechanical machinery) but also in many new brands of high 
technologies. 
CEPAL – Serie Comercio internacional No 101   Is the Czech economy a success story? The case of CzechInvest… 
55 
Bibliography 
Accenture (2007). The Rise of Multi-Polar World. Washington, Accenture Agency. 
Ayyagari M., Kosova R. (2006). Does FDI Facilitate Domestic Entrepreneurship? 
Evidence from the Czech Republic. Prague, CERGE-EI, December. 
Benacek V. (2001a). The Generic Private Sector in an Economy of Transition: 
Developments and Impacts on the Czech Economy. IIASA-Austria, IR-01-046. 
____ (2001b). “FDI, International Trade and the Adjustments to World 
Markets in a Small Open Economy of Transition” in: The 10-Year Review 
of Transitional Economies. Final Report. UNIDO, Vienna, p. 127-142. 
Benacek V., Mejstrik M. (1993). Textile and Clothing Industry. A Comparative 
Study of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Portugal, jointly with C. Corado,  
W. Caban and M. Mejstřík. Working Paper of New University of Lisbon. 
Bendl P. (2002). Investment Incentives – Hope or a Trap? Prague, CEP 
Papers, No. 19. 
Campos N., Kinoshita Y. (2002). FDI as Technology Transferred: Some Panel 
Evidence from Transition Economies. The Manchester School, vol. 70, No. 3. 
____ (2003). Why Does FDI Go Where it Goes? New Evidence from the 
Transition Economies. IMF, Washington, IMF WP/03/228. 
CzechInvest (2004). Annual Report.  
____ (2005). Annual Report.  
Economic Growth Strategy of the Czech Republic (2005). Documents of the 
Czech Government Office, November. 
Euroactiv (2007). Slight increase in the EU R&D Investment [online] 
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/science/slight-increase-eu-investment/article-
135994 >.  
Görg H. and Greenaway D. (2002). Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic 
Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Investment? CEPR Discussion Paper 
no. 3485, August. 
Howell J. (1995). Understanding Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe. 
London, Ernst and Young. 
 
CEPAL – Serie Comercio internacional No 101   Is the Czech economy a success story? The case of CzechInvest… 
56 
Imbs J., Wacziarg R.(2003). Stages of Diversification. Am. Ec. Review, 93 (1), p. 63-86. 
Jahn M. (2002). Investment Incentives are Profitable. Prague, CEP Papers, No. 1. 
Javorcik B. (2004). Does FDI Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? Amer. Econ. Review, 94 (3). 
Klaus V. (2002). Investment Incentives Cut Back the Economic Efficiency. Prague, Hospodarske Noviny, May. 
Krugman P., Obstfeld M. (2003). International Economics. Addison Wesley, Boston. 
Krugman P., A. Smith (eds) (1994) Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy, NBER-PR Report, Washington. 
Leibenstein H. (1995). The Supply of Entrepreneurship, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Malisova-Mikovcova K. (2007). The CzechInvest Strategy 2007 – 2013, CzechInvest, Prague. 
Mencinger J. (2003). Does FDI Always Enhance Economic Growth? Kyklos, vol. 56 (4), p. 491-508. 
OECD (2006) “Progress in Policy Reforms to Improve the Investment Climate in South East Europe” in 
OECD Investment Reform Index 2006,  Paris. 
Olson M. (2000). Power and Prosperity. Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. Basic Books, New York 
Rodrik D. (2004). Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century. UNIDO, 2004. 
Stejskal J., Charbursky M. (2005) The Analysis of the AfterCare Policies in Czech Republic. Pilsen, 
University of Pilsen, mimeographed. 
Streblov P. (2003). Strategic Trade and Industrial Policies - An Issue for the Small Transition Economies? 
IIASA, Vienna, WP no. 6 [online] <http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/ETI/docs/Occasional/Streblov.pdf>. 
The Czech Economic Growth Strategy for 2005 – 2013 (2005), strategic document of the Czech Government,  
The Investment Incentives Act. Act No 72/2000 Sb., Prague, 2000. 
TPCA (2007): TPCA – 5 Succesful Years.  Press release of TPCA [online] <http://www.tcpa.cz/download/ 
press/30-file/5-let-TPCA-v-Ceske-republice.pdf>. 
Zamrazilova E. (2007): FDI in the Czech Economy. Politicka Ekonomie, vol. 60, Prague. 
Zemplinerova A. (2004): The Importance of Foreign-owned Enterprises in the Catching-up Process. In: 
Liebscher et al., 2004. 
____ (2006): Effects of the State Aid to Enterprises (in Czech). Politicka Ekonomie, vol. 54, No. 2. 
Zemplinerova A., Panes P. (2007): State Aid and Competitiveness of Enterprises (in Czech). Prague, CERGE-
EI, Interim Report. 
CEPAL – Serie Comercio internacional No 101   Is the Czech economy a success story? The case of CzechInvest… 
57 
Annex 
CEPAL – Serie Comercio internacional No 101   Is the Czech economy a success story? The case of CzechInvest… 
59 
Annex 1 - Case studies 
1. Skoda-Matsushita in Pilsen: on how to convert  
heavy machinery into electronics 
Skoda Pilsen was one of the biggest centers of steel and machinery industries since the times of Austrian 
empire. It was famous for its long-range guns, turbines and locomotives. Since 1970’s it was also a 
center of nuclear program. After the fall of communism this behemoth monopoly was nearly closed 
down. The problem of Skoda had two intertwined roots.  
The privatization to an indigenous owner brought neither capital for the necessary technology and 
product modernization, nor the know-how needed for the market focus change from the east to the west. 
The company headed directly to bankruptcy. In 1999 an agreement was reached between Skoda and 
creditor banks and the situation was stabilized. In 2000 Skoda Holding (covering many subsidiaries) was 
set up and the ownership changed again when Appian Group in 2003 bought 100 percent of equity. 
The product portfolio was extremely wide, practically without specialization throughout the 
supply chain. It consisted of many machinery products and also of own construction works, transport 
and catering. Many of these were free riding from the profitable branches (transport technology, energy 
and nuclear machinery). The company was focused by 80 percent on the domestic market, which was 
hardly developing. The new focus on core business and change of the orientation from domestic to 
world markets brought a positive change in the company economic results. 
At the beginning of 1990 Skoda employed 40 000 workers. Now it is less than 4000 but the turnover 
and profits have been multiplied. Skoda became a problem of the whole region. In case of its complete 
bankruptcy the unemployment and poverty would be one of the highest in the country. It was evident since 
1991 that the workers would have to re-trained and the industrial specialization would have to be re-oriented. 
This would not happen without the help of the government. The initiative started from the municipal 
government that converted the military airfield of 120 hectares into an industrial zone owned initially by the 
government. (Later the land was sold to investors and all costs returned with a profit.) The first idea was to 
attract the car industry, as the closest substitute for heavy machinery. Therefore the location of the industrial 
area was across the street from Skoda’s estates. The industrial park thus could integrate with Skoda and reach 
also the campus of the local university. The spillovers from the park would be therefore multiplied. 
The negotiations with Mercedes-Benz failed and the second choice fell on electronics, 
notwithstanding that at that time it was considered an industry without comparative advantages in this 
country. It was the correct choice –industrial policies should target industries that would break the 
barriers. Now electronics is acclaimed as a perspective booming industry in the region. 
The Matsushita/Panasonic was in 1996 the principal investor in the whole region (and the first 
Japanese firm in the country) and it was also the first acquisition in the industrial area. This project was the 
first of this type in the Czech Republic where municipal government would be involved so intensively in 
such an extensive entrepreneurial venture. At the beginning, Panasonic employed 700 workers. At the 
present time it is more than 5000. In the entire industrial zone operate now almost 50 companies, which are 
employing 11 000 employees. The former assembly factory has changed into a production supported by 
high-tech services. The characteristics of the industrial area are indicated in Table 4. 
The presence of Matsushita attracted an influx of investors into the area. The city reacted by 
establishing an R&D park. At present the area operates two large R&D development centers (a 
subsidiary of Matsushita/Panasonic and Mercedes), business incubator and service company with 
worldwide activity (Solectron). The cooperation with the local university, which specializes in 
electronics and machinery, is a part of the cluster. As the next step, Pilsen City has decided to build 
another R&D part (6th River) where the university will be a partner. The investment of Matsushita/ 
Panasonic in Pilsen can be evaluated as a model of successful FDI in the Czech Republic. 
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TABLE 1.1 
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PILSEN INDUSTRIAL AREA 
Newly created jobs 11000 
(in 1998-2006) 
Number of jobs in the walking neighbourhood 
(including Skoda and university) 
16000 
Investment by the municipal government US$22 million 
Subsidies of the central government 
(via CszechInvest) 
US$3 million 
Private co-financing US$1,3 million 
Attracted foreign capital USS370 million 
Attracted domestic capital US$110 million 
Cost of one new job from public expenditure USS$2200 
Cost of incentives per private capital inflows 9,4% 
Source: Author, based on official numbers 
 
 
The Pilsen industrial area project is a result of successful interaction of regional and municipal 
governments, CzechInvest state agency with private businesses. Its establishment led to a creation of 
local cluster where the establishment of a large business (Matsushita/ Panasonic) led to spinoffs of R&D 
development and the establishment of indigenous and foreign startups, many of which were SMEs. 
2. The Czech aircraft industry: the fall and the resurrection  
of aero industries 
If the communist high technology in the Czech Republic had ever achieved an international prestige in 
some technology it was in the aircraft industry. The top company among them was Aero – one of the 
world’s largest suppliers of light military jets since 1960s. The rent-seeking of insiders brought it to 
bankruptcy and the ill-conceived industrial policies opened it to moral hazard. The sale to Boeing, as a 
strategic investor, shunted its state-of-the-art machines off the world markets. Finally, an indigenous 
Czecho-Slovak private equity investor, a start-up in the business, brought it back there with a clean 
bottom line.  
AERO Vodochody, PLC, (hereinafter “Aero”), an aerospace producer established in 1919 was in the 
second half of the 20th century the world’s biggest producer of military subsonic aircrafts. Its aircrafts of 
own construction supplied over 60 percent of the world’s sales of training jets. Its light combat jets L-29 
Delfin and L-39 Albatros were used all over the non-NATO countries during the last 46 years. The number 
of aircrafts produced exceeded 6500 units. The capacity in 1990 was over 100 units of high-tech jets. In 
addition, the Czech Republic produced top sport and acrobatic aircrafts and gliders and it had successful 
production of small passenger turbo-propelled aircrafts. From the technical point of view, there was hardly 
any reason why they should not be competitive abroad during transition. Nevertheless, all of them were 
nearly completely liquidated. Their case is a proof that in oligopolistic market structure institutional and 
political factors are more important than technological or economic proficiency.  
From the very moment of transition in 1990 Aero lost its Eastern markets and it was obliged to 
change fundamentally its production activities. The over-staffing was at least treble of what an efficient 
producer would tolerate, there was a minimal outsourcing abroad and a low cooperation with strategic 
partners. The government fully controlled the management through its representatives in the board of 
directors and kept the company out of privatization. Soon it was clear that Aero can not survive without 
an intervention of the government. Instead of applying a strategic trade policy to bring the company in 
alignment with some consortium of fringe competitors on world markets, the company was kept in 
autarchy by subsidizing its production to inventories. The purchase of 72 new jets by the Ministry of 
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Defense for US$ 1,6 billion, a sort of hidden subsidy in order to attract Boeing, did not solve the causes 
of problems, even though Boeing has finally arrived.  
By presuming that on world markets it is the quality and high technology only that sells (as the 
doctrine of innovation policies claims) and, in defiance to policies of oligopolistic alignment, it 
continued in developing the L-159 state-of-the-art combat jet, where the possibility of international 
cooperation (e.g. with Brazil, etc.) was completely ignored. Similarly the extensive chain of Czech 
suppliers did not restructure in time, relying on the traditional industrial policy of “helping the future 
innovative winners”. The whole chain was on verge of collapse in 1997.  
In 1998 the new cabinet decided to sell 34 percent of equity to Boeing. The trade was between the 
Czech and the US government without announcing any competition. The price was US$ 16 million, plus 
offsets34 of US$ 42 million and a promise of an ambitious business plan to bring Aero again among the 
top of world players. The Boeing was given another incentive: the access to L-159 technologies in the 
category where Boeing was not so far ahead, plus the mentioned “fire sale” rescue contract from the 
Czech Ministry of Defense and a government guarantee for US$ 400 million on the concluded 
commercial loan. Altogether the state aid reached US$ 2,8 billion. The involvement of Boeing was a 
technological break-through. The new avionic systems for L-159 lifted the former low cost DIY-
repairable aircraft into the category of top market were Aero had no previous experience and no 
customers. Hardly anyone from a developing country would dare purchasing such a jet that required 
wide technological support and an approval from Pentagon.  
In an attempt to utilize its extensive production capacity, Aero decided to move into a new 
cooperation. There was a clash of interests with Boeing, which took new cooperation programs for a part 
of its own business and offset commitments. As a compromise, there was agreed the licensed production 
of Sikorsky S76C helicopter in 2000. The financial management of this new project was, however, 
lagging behind expectations.  
For the duration of the partnership between Aero and Boeing none of the conditions, which had 
been enshrined in the jointly compiled plan for the period 1998–2008, were met. Boeing did not support 
the marketing of L-159 through its networks and no new contracts were established. There was a 
paradox: Aero could flood the world markets with the best jets in its category, able to match supersonics 
with its combat properties and electronics, but no government was encouraged to purchase them. Such 
sales are not possible without inter-governmental negotiations. Aero was again on a verge of bankruptcy. 
In 2004 Boeing sold its shares back to the Czech government for 8 cents. A partial change to the better 
came when the contract with Sikorsky was re-negotiated after Boeing’s departure. Subsidies for keeping 
the employees in had to continue, though.  
In 2006 it was decided about privatization and, in defiance to the interests of some insiders, about 
a competitive bidding. The latter (where the EU competition policies stroke the difference) turned to be 
the crucial moment of the whole travesty of Aero. The only criterion became the price, not the “beauty 
contest” with promised business plans. Surprisingly, the clear winner was the local private equity group 
Penta with an offer of US$ 116 million. Its new management designed a new immediate restructuring 
plan where Aero will discontinue on its dominant reliance on L-159, but will develop cooperation in 
components with firms delivering the final products (like Sikorsky or Airbus). As it happened so many 
times before in similar circumstances,35 the government lacked the entrepreneurial “hunch” in 
                                                        
34
 Offsets are incentives of the sellers of armaments to the purchasing party (the government), which offer various 
intermediation services, such as reciprocity contracts and other aids in kind. The governments can then argue that the 
purchase of armaments (generally considered by public as useless) offers other advantages to the country. The problem of 
offsets is in the control of what concretely was actually agreed and how it counts. For example, all future sales from the 
purchasing country can be declared a part of the offset contract ex post. Also the litigation of the contract for offsets is usually 
difficult to enforce. In case of Boeing, offset “deals” that Czechs were not able to accept because they were not advantageous 
for the local enterprises (e.g. they require further local subsidies) were considered a fulfilled commitment by Boeing. 
35
 The main Czech losses in the process of restructuring were Poldi (producing specialized steel alloys for high-tech 
industries), Tatra/LIAZ (producing 30 000 top heavy-duty military trucks a year) and Skoda Pilsen (energy 
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recognizing in which industries an indigenous firm can compete on globalized markets as a “super-tier 
producer” (i.e. a producer of its own final product), where it can be just an excellent outsourced supplier 
of tier-one and where the company should be rather closed down. 
The potential of the firm revealed its power nearly instantly, once the strategy had clear objectives 
for survival. In six months the balance sheets of Aero turned for the first time to profits. The output 
increased by twenty percent even though the staff was cut by 400 employees. New contracts were 
signed, promising the volume of sales to double in the next three years. The demand for local 
outsourcing (based on the technological cluster spun-off from the automobile boom) and for high skilled 
employees will rise. Most probably these will not be the skills for replacing the super-technologies of 
Boeing, but the position indigenous producers in the second-tier high-tech will definitely strengthen. The 
plans are to recover also the production of sport and passenger aviation industry. For example, Czech 
Aircraft Works of Kunovice has been recovering from the past depression and it expects to sell 140 light 
sport aircraft in 2007. A similar recovery has occurred at Moravan Aviation producing acrobatic aircraft. 
Present total employment in aircraft and space industries of 7000 can thus recover to previous levels. 
Industrial policies in this specific segment of technologies and marketing have definitely its place; 
however, they should be also restructured and targeted at activities where they are efficient. 
Conclusions for the government policies from this case study: 
• The objectives of national self-reliance in the full supply chain of products are counter productive. 
• State corporate governance (even tough at a level of “marginal control”) is dangerous –not so 
much for its entrepreneurial incompetence but for the incentives of moral hazard it opens. 
• Selling to a foreign strategic partner of the first class (e.g. to Boeing) can backfire whenever 
there arises a conflict of interest within the hierarchy of the dominant firm. The risk of a 
hostile takeover is lower when the partner has less dominant power and more incentives for a 
strategy or cooperation.  
• Privatization of an enterprise cushioned by an access to state support schemes tends to end up 
in an auction of future subsidies, not an action of future revaluation of assets (equity) owned.  
• The contestability of the tender is a crucial criterion. It should have just one criterion: the price 
free of any future subsidies. 
• Contracts accompanied by offset clauses become highly opaque and difficult to enforce them. 
They should be excluded a priory from any government negotiations. 
• Search for the location of a firm within the network of international supply chains in an 
entrepreneurial art that cannot be done by the state. Its policies, however, can successfully target 
the mitigation of risks from restructuring. They can support the information flows, encourage the 
setting up of social infrastructure required for restructuring and build the trust among potential 
partners where overcoming of uncertainties needs credible external guarantees.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
production equipment). All of them could survive if the policies used would be more pro-competitive, pro-
restructuring and tied at the end to an optimal position in the international supply chain. Skoda-Auto can be taken for 
a comparison. Its privatization to VW brought it to technological peaks and its present employment is 27000, plus 
the employments is associated spinoffs of 83000. The art of transition from a former vertical or horizontal monopoly 
to independent firms competing on world markets rests in finding the optimal size and location in the supply chains. 
This cannot be decided by the government. However, its policies can speed up and make the search of relocation 
more efficient. It is aging the problem of information and coordination failures the industrial policies can mitigate. 
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